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I
INTRODUCTION

This article examines the relationship between EPA and the federal courts
during the first twenty years of the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), concentrating in particular on the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, which hears the vast majority of challenges to major EPA
decisions.
The stance of the federal courts toward the Environmental Protection
Agency has changed substantially during this period. An early mix of
enthusiasm for the project of environmental protection, respect for the public
policy decisions of the Congress, and a rhetoric of close scrutiny of EPA's
decisionmaking processes has given way to neutrality toward environmental
values, skepticism about whether environmental legislation expresses
coherent public policy, and a rhetoric of deference toward EPA's decisions.
This shift is apparent in both doctrinal changes and in the language of
judicial opinions reviewing EPA decisionmaking. It is part of a larger
reorientation of the federal courts toward judicial review of agency
decisionmaking generally. During the period we study, scholarly analyses of
aggressive judicial review of agency rulemaking have also moved from
agreement with the judiciary's early self-evaluation that "agencies and courts
together constitute a 'partnership' in furtherance of the public interest, and
are 'collaborative instrumentalities ofjustice,' "' to a more negative appraisal.
As Peter Strauss has recently observed, "recent scholarship is tending to [view
judicial review as] paralyzing" the ability of administrative agencies to carry
out their statutory responsibilities, or-what is not always the same thing-to
2
develop sound public policy.
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In this article, we correlate these changes to a parallel set of changes in
political assumptions regarding the behavior of individuals and political
institutions, some of which have been previously noted by others.3 This
analysis proves relevant to a recurring question within legal theory generally:
when law is at its best, is it an autonomous discipline, independent from
outside influences, especially politics? Our answer, at least in the field of
administrative law, is that law and politics are ineluctably connected, in that it
is impossible for courts to develop legal doctrine without a set of political
assumptions to guide them, and that it is ultimately impossible to evaluate the
merits or demerits of aggressive judicial review (or any regime of judicial
review) without also invoking some set of political assumptions. Although we
do not prove the impossibility of severing that connection here, we do
demonstrate that the changes in judicial doctrine, judicial rhetoric, and
academic appraisal can be best explained by displaying their consistency to
concurrent changes in political assumptions. This sort of connection between
law and politics, while it has been taken for granted by some, 4 appears directly
to contradict the widely held belief that if law is to retain its integrity and
social value, it must remain isolated from political influence. 5 As popular as
that belief may be, it rests on a misunderstanding.
Elucidating the connection between law and political assumptions does
more than contribute to a theoretical debate. Defining the appropriate nature
ofjudicial review of agency action has been one of the "persistently intriguing
puzzles" in American administrative law. 6 Using EPA as an important
("CEQ, Sixteenth Annual Report") ("Fully 85 percent of EPA's regulations result in litigation."). Thus
if paralysis of administrative agencies exists, such paralysis must affect EPA.
This recent, more negative attitude is by no means universally held. Many continue to urge that
the benefits of judicial review outweigh whatever negative effects one might claim it has. See, for
example, Cynthia Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89
Colum L Rev 452 (1989); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory
Change and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 Cornell L Rev 1101 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein,
Factions, Self-Interest and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 Va L Rev 271, 287-92 (1986).
Nevertheless, it is at a minimum fair to say that the general tenor of expert wisdom on the question
has shifted during the 20 years of EPA's existence from nearly unmitigated support for active judicial
superintendence of EPA's decisionmaking processes to something between much more cautious
support and outright hostility, and that this shift has been matched in the judiciary. Because the
decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v NRDC, 467 US 837 (1984), marks a turn away from aggressive
judicial review, the more negative appraisal frequently expresses itself as approval for Chevron's
general direction. See, for example, Richard J. Pierce, Sidney A. Shapiro & Paul R. Verkuil,
Administrative Law and Process 405, 522 n135 (Foundation Press, 1985); Colin S. Diver, Statutory
Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U Pa L Rev 549 (1985); RichardJ. Pierce, Chevron and its
Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 Vand L Rev 301 (1988).
Chevron is discussed firther at text accompanying notes 205-46.
3. Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 Stan L Rev 1189 (1986); Farina,
89 Colum L Rev 452 (cited in note 2); Aman, 73 Cornell L Rev 1101 (cited in note 2); Richard B.
Stewart, Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv L Rev 1667 (1975); Cass R. Sunstein,
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv 1, Rev 421 (1987); Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in
the Regulatory State, 103 Harv L Rev 405 (1989).
4. See, for example. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale LJ 1539, 1548
(1989) ("American public law might be understood as a set of conflicts among competing
conceptions of the nature of American political life.").
5. See text at notes 39-46.
6. Farina, 89 Colum L Rev at 452 (cited in note 2).
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example, this article argues that understanding some fundamental political
assumptions materially assists in solving this puzzle. Indeed, this claim is
implicit in much of the administrative law literature, which argues for
particular styles of judicial review by making political arguments. 7 Our
intention is to make the connections explicit by describing two sets of political
assumptions, one more or less in place when EPA was created, the other more
or less in place today, and showing how the change from one to the other has
been paralleled by a change in the doctrine and rhetoric ofjudicial decisions.
The current move away from aggressive judicial review cannot simply be
reduced to politics, however. Changes in environmental legislation, in the
nature of litigation against the agency, and in the kinds of questions EPA
frequently faces in reaching its decisions have also affected the value of
aggressive judicial review.
These contextual changes have also interacted with changes in political
assumptions, and in more than one way. For one thing, less aggressive
judicial review by the courts stimulates Congress to write ever more specific
statutes, as it tries to be so specific in expressing its will that even a deferential
court will be able to help police agency compliance.8
Such responses to judicial restraint can, in turn, reinforce the political
arguments for deferential review, thus creating a reinforcing feedback loop.
When Congress writes quite specific statutes it often finds itself making
detailed trade-offs that are consistent with the view that Congress enacts
specific deals hammered out among competing private interests. 9 The
conception of the legislative process as private deal-making then contributes
to a judicial tendency to place more stock in policy fashioned in the executive
than the legislature, and therefore to defer to the former.' 0
The adoption of more specific statutes, of course, need not necessarily be
viewed as an endorsement of the political arguments for deferential review.
Instead, these statutes may reflect Congress's continuing concern with agency
capture, a phenomenon that aggressive review seeks to keep in check. I' Thus,
whether the adoption of highly detailed statutes supports a posture of
aggressive or deferential review depends largely upon the political
assumptions underlying those kinds of review.
Still other of these contextual changes during the past twenty years would
have diminished the value attributed to judicial review regardless of
underlying political assumptions. For instance, decisionmaking on the basis
of quantitative cost benefit analysis, which has become much more prevalent
in the context of environmental policy since 1970, is an activity that largely
7. See, for example, Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 4 11-12 (cited in note 3); Richard J. Pierce, The
Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 Tex L Rev 469, 504-13 (1985).
8. See text at notes 309-12.
9. See text at notes 164-202.
10. See text at notes 205-42.
See text at notes 99-123, and text following note 304. See also Richard J. Lazarus, The
11.
Tragedv of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, 54 1, & Contemp Probs 311, 32 I
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must be left to the discretion of administrative agencies under many different
political regimes. 12 As a result, aggressive judicial review appears less
worthwhile as the administrative state turns to more quantitatively
sophisticated means of decisionmaking.
This article begins by tracing these and other related contextual changes
in environmental statutes, litigation, and problems. It then explores the
political environment within which these changes took place, contrasting the
political assumptions prevalent in EPA's formative years with those in place
today, and positing that the changes in these assumptions are connected to
the movement from aggressive to deferential judicial review. The article
concludes by evaluating judicial review by reference to both the political
assumptions and contextual changes explored earlier.
II
CHANGES IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS, STATUTES, AND LITIGATION

The first wave of environmental legislation was directed at the problems
that were easiest to see and resolve. Burning rivers' 3 and lakes suffocating
from massive algal blooms' 4 were obvious targets for remediation. The smog
covering the nation's urban areas and the odors emanating from open solid
waste dumps cried out for attention.' 5 In the face of these conspicuous ills,
Congress enunciated broad declarations of intent to "protect and enhance"
the nation's resources' 6 and to eliminate pollutant discharges.' 7 Just as the
problems seemed obvious, so did the most effective solutions. The early
legislation required EPA and the states to prohibit or control industrial and
municipal discharges from both stationary and mobile sources, 8 typically by
imposing end-of-pipe controls.' 9 A direct cause and effect relationship
between compliance with these limitations on pollutant discharges and a
cleaner environment was simply assumed.
Twenty years later, these early assessments of the nature of both
environmental problems and their resolution seem naive. First, the problems
recognized and addressed in the early 1970s have proven more obstinate than
they first appeared. For example, despite the realization of significant tailpipe
emissions reductions by automobile manufacturers, emissions of some
automobile pollutants actually increased between 1970 and 1987.20
12. See text at notes 295-96.
13. The Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, Ohio and the Rouge River in Dearborn, Michigan were
so polluted with flammable materials in the 1960s and early 1970s that they repeatedly caught fire.
See United States v Ashland Oil and Transp. Co., 504 F2d 1317, 1326 (6th Cir 1974).
14. See Environmental Quality: Twentieth Annual Report 216 (Council on Environmental Quality,
1989) ("CEQ, Twentieth Annual Report") (referring to Lake Erie).
15. Id.
16. Air Pollution Prevention and Control, 42 USC § 7401(b)(1) (1988).
17. Water Pollution Prevention and Control, 33 USC § 1251(a)(1) (1988).
18. See, for example, 33 USC §§ 1311, 1316 (1988); 42 USC §§ 7410-7412, 7521-7522 (1988);
Public Water Systems, 42 USC §§ 300g-300g-3 (1988).
19. See, for example, CEQ, Twentieth Annual Report at 220 (cited in note 14).
20. Id at 8 (nitrogen oxides, from 18.1 to 19.5 million tons annually).
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Discharges of other such pollutants have been reduced, yet national health
standards remain unmet in many urban areas. 2 ' The Clean Water Act's
system of point source controls undoubtedly has improved the quality of the
nation's rivers and lakes, but it is now clear that nonpoint sources, which are
harder to control both technologically and politically, continue to contribute
heavily to surface water pollution. Second, problems undiscovered or
ignored twenty years ago have since attracted attention, and they promise to
be even more intractable than the first targets of environmental concern.
Some, like groundwater pollution, are difficult to locate and control because
of the physical inaccessibility of the resource. 22 Others, like the toxic waste
sites targeted by the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, 23 are resistant to rapid amelioration because
available resources are insufficient to determine the responsible parties and to
carry out cleanup operations. Still other problems, like acid rain, cross both
state and international boundaries, creating obstacles to either state or
national resolution. Finally, controversy embroils the issue of whether
conditions like global warming are even the subject of legitimate concern.
Effective steps to redress such difficulties seem years away at best.
The federal statutes aimed at controlling pollution have undergone a
corresponding metamorphosis. The initial wave of legislation has been
extensively supplemented and revised to extend coverage, 24 address
problems previously overlooked, 25 and fine-tune or redirect incomplete or
unsuccessful programs. 26 Recent statutory amendments also reflect
Congress's view that at least part of the failure to achieve earlier statutory
objectives was attributable to flaws in EPA's implementation. This legislation
accordingly has sought to constrain EPA's discretion more narrowly than did
earlier statutes, which contained somewhat broader delegations of authority.
To combat EPA's delays in carrying out its statutory responsibilities,
Congress has recently relied more heavily on deadlines for agency actions,
such as the issuance of regulations. To prevent EPA from implementing
statutes in a manner contrary to congressional intent, Congress has
27
prescribed more detailed substantive criteria for EPA decisionmaking.
21. EPA reported that during 1989 about 110 U.S. urban areas failed to meet the national ozone
standard and about 50 areas did not meet the standard for carbon monoxide. Id.
22. See generally, Robert L. Glicksman & George C. Coggins, Groundwater Pollution I: The
Problem and the Law, 35 U Kan L Rev 75 (1986); David H. Getches, Groundwater Quality Protection:
Setting A National Goal for State and Federal Programs, 65 Chi-Kent L Rev 387 (1990).
23. 42 USC §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
24. See, for example, 33 USC § 1329 (1988) (1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act to
manage nonpoint source pollution).
25. See, for example, 42 USC §§ 6991-6991i (1988) (1984 amendments to the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act to regulate underground storage tanks).
26. See, for example, 42 USC §§ 7501-7508 (1988) (1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act to
expedite air quality improvement in areas not yet complying with the national ambient air quality
standards); Pub L No 101-549, §§ 101-111, 104 Stat 2399-2471 (1990) (1990 amendments to the
Clean Air Act addressing nonattainment areas).
27. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
Quiet Revolution in Administrative Low, 1988 Duke L J 819.
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Statutory hammers have combined these two techniques by mandating
regulatory results if EPA does not address a problem within a specified time.28
To provide opportunities for private enforcement in the event EPA fails to
pursue statutory violations, Congress has expanded pre-existing citizen suit
30
provisions 29 and added such provisions to statutes previously lacking them.
A third facet of the changing landscape of environmental law is the nature
of environmental litigation. The early cases involving judicial review of EPA
decisions focused on the federal pesticide legislation and the Clean Air and
Water Acts and sought to flesh out the content of key statutory programs. 3 '
The volume of this kind of litigation appears to have increased, with the bulk
of the cases having shifted to newer statutes like the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act ("RCRA"). 32 The volume of judicial enforcement actions
also has grown. From fiscal years 1972 through 1976, for example, EPA
referred twenty-seven air pollution, eighty-eight water pollution, and zero
hazardous waste or toxics cases to the Justice Department for civil
prosecution. In fiscal year 1989 alone, referrals in these three areas rose to
ninety-two, ninety-four, and 178. 33 Criminal prosecutions, which did not
4
begin until 1982, averaged thirty per year between 1986 and 1989.3 Citizen

suit litigation also has expanded. In the 1970s, citizen suits against polluters
were rare. 3 5 Actions seeking to force EPA to perform nondiscretionary duties
were more common, and sometimes resulted in major shifts in statutory
direction 36 or the creation of entirely new statutory programs. 37 Private
citizen enforcement actions, especially under the Clean Water Act and RCRA,
increased

noticeably

in

the

1980s. 38

Suits

seeking

compliance

with

nondiscretionary duties continued to be filed against EPA, though not always
with the impact of some of the precedent-setting cases of the earlier period.
28. See, for example, 42 USC § 6924(f)(3) (1988) (prohibiting disposal of hazardous wastes in
deep injection wells if EPA does not issue regulations limiting such disposal before the statutory
deadline).
29. See, for example, 42 USC § 6972(a)(l)(B) (1988) (authorizing citizen suits under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act against persons contributing to imminent hazards).
30. See, for example, 42 USC § 9659 (1988) (added to Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act in 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act). The citizen suit provisions also authorize suits to require EPA to perform non-discretionary
duties. See id § 9659(a)(2).
31. See, for example, Ethyl Corp. v EPA, 541 F2d I (DC Cir 1976); International Harvester Co. v
Ruckelshaus, 478 F2d 615 (DC Cir 1973); Environmental Defense Fund v Ruckelshaus, 439 F2d 584 (DC
Cir 1971) ("EDF v Ruckelshaus").
32. See, for example, American Petroleum Inst. v EPA, 906 F2d 729 (DC Cir 1990); Hazardous WVaste
Treatment Council v EPA, 886 F2d 355 (DC Cir 1989); Mobil Oil Corp. v EPA, 871 F2d 149 (DC Cir
1989).
33. CEQ., Twentieth Annual Report at 156 (cited in note 14).
34. Id.
35. Id at 210.
36. See, for example, NRDC v Train, 8 Envir Rep Cases 2120 (D DC 1976) (resulting in the
consent decree that set in motion EPA's issuance under the Clean Water Act of effluent limitations
for point sources discharging toxic pollutants).
37. See, for example, Sierra Club v Ruckelshaus, 344 F Supp 253 (D DC 1972), aff'd sub nom Fri v
Sierra Club, 412 US 541 (1973) (requiring EPA to implement a program to prevent the deterioration
of air quality in areas already complying with the national ambient air quality standards).
38. CEQ, Twentieth Annual Report at 210-11 (cited in note 14).
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By 1990, then, the subjects of environmental concern seemed both more
numerous and more complex than they had been during EPA's fledgling
years. The magnitude and detail of the federal legislation enacted in response
to these problems had evolved correspondingly and the litigation filed to
interpret, implement, and enforce this legislation proceeded apace.
III
POLITICAL CHANGES

In the opinion of some, politics constitutes a threat to the integrity of legal
decisionmaking. "Depoliticizing the law" was official policy of the Reagan
Administration. 3 9 The possibility that judges might mistake political
preferences for legal principles concerns law school deans, 40 politicians, 4' and
Supreme Court nominees alike, 42 and the "seduction of law by politics" is the
theme of startlingly severe attacks on the entire sweep of American
constitutional law. 4 3 While the idea that law is a form of politics is typically
associated with the left, 4 4 even left-leaning thinkers occasionally assert that
law can lay claim to objective truths or right answers, 4 5 which would
apparently place legal decisionmaking on much firmer ground than the
46
shifting sands of political dispute and compromise.
In this section, we document a broad shift in a set of political assumptions
that has occurred in the past twenty years and show how that shift correlates
with and helps explain changes in doctrine and rhetoric. We suggest that the
best way to understand these latter changes is to see that judicial review of
agency decisionmaking is necessarily premised on a set of contestable
assumptions and that, as those assumptions shift, doctrines of judicial review
will also change. In the following section, we argue not only that correlating
politics and law provides the best explanation for why judicial doctrine has
39. See the speech by Attorney General Edwin Meese to the American Bar Association in 1985,
advocating a "jurisprudence of original intention": "A jurisprudence that seeks fidelity to the
Constitution-a jurisprudence of original intention-is not a jurisprudence of political results. It is
very much concerned with process, and it is a jurisprudence that in our day seeks to depoliticize the
law." Reprinted in Jack N. Rakove, ed, Interpreting the Constitution 13, 19 (Northeastern U Press,
1990).
40. See Paul Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34J Legal Educ 222. 226 (1984) ("[L]awyers like
pilots must be always distrustful of themselves, on guard against the risk of mistaking their own
political or social preferences for those of the law.").
41. Orrin G. Hatch, The Dangers of Political Law, 75 Cornell L Rev 1338 (1990).
42. Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, on the Nomination
of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, S Hrg 1001011, Pt 1, 103-05 (1987) (opening statement of Robert H. Bork) ("Bork Hearings").
43. See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (Free Press,
1990).
44. See, for example, David Kairys, ed, The Politics of Law (Pantheon Books, 1990).
45. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 81-130 (Harv U Press, 1977).
46. A great deal of legal iheory defines its central project as the "attempt to answer normative
questions about what the law should be by identifying a neutral and objective decision procedure
that can generate answers and that fairly filters the shared values of individuals in the community
through legitimate institutional structures." Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 Cal L Rev 465,
535-36 (1988); see also, Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards. Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 Yale
LJ 1 (1984).
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changed, but that politics must also provide the justification for that doctrine
as well. In other words, both the question "does law follow politics?" and the
question "should law follow politics?" must be answered affirmatively.
A.

An Overview of Twenty Years of Political and Legal Change

Politics has been described as addressing the question of "how to achieve
the goal of the good person in the good state given existing conditions and
the qualities of human nature."'4 7 Any theory building on existing conditions
and existing qualities of human nature must adopt some working assumptions
about how participants in political life behave and how political institutions
behave. Such assumptions are necessary to determine both what is desirable
and what is feasible in political life. During the heyday of aggressive judicial
review, the influential working assumptions included the belief that although
the legislative process involved battles among interest groups, the legislature,
by mediating those conflicts, was capable of synthesizing the competing
interests into a purposeful, coherent public policy, and often did. 48 This
assumption enabled the Legal Process school to advocate judicial resolution
of statutory ambiguities by reference to discernible statutory purposes. 49 The
assumption is reflected in the courts emphasizing their obligation to ensure
50
that administrative action was consistent with legislative intent.
At the same time as this optimistic view of the legislative process held
sway, the administrative process was treated more skeptically: the working

assumption was that regulatory agencies were all too susceptible to
corruption and manipulation by organized private interests. 5 1 Although this
skepticism originated in analyses of the traditional regulatory agencies, it
extended to EPA as well. 5 2 As a result, the courts were not inclined to defer
to EPA in resolving issues of environmental policy. Through review of both
the substantive merit and procedural propriety of EPA's decisions, the courts
sought to adjust the administrative process in order to confine agency
discretion and prevent EPA's perceived vulnerability to special interests from
thwarting legislative goals. 53 In the environmental field, this inclination
toward judicial aggressiveness was heightened by a further assumption about
the aims of the good state, namely that a national consensus had developed
54
that protecting environmental values was highly desirable.
By the late 1980s, each of these assumptions had shifted dramatically.
Views of the legislative process were revised under the influence of public
47. Martin M. Shapiro, Prudence and Rationality under the Constitution, in Gary C. Bryner & Dennis
L. Thompson, eds, The Constitutionand the Regulation of Society 213, 213 (Brigham Young U, 1988). See
also Sunstein, 97 Yale LJ at 1542 (cited in note 4) ("American public law might be understood as a
set of conflicts among competing conceptions of the nature of American political life.").
48. See text accompanying notes 60-98.
49. See text accompanying notes 71-73.
50. See text accompanying notes 80-97.
51. See text accompanying notes 99-123.
52. See Lazarus, 54 L & Contemp Probs at 315-17 (cited in note 11).
53. See text accompanying notes 73-97.
54. See text accompanying notes 128-40.
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choice theory. Instead of seeing legislators as rational and honest brokers
seeking to fashion sound policy in a competitive political marketplace, public
choice theorists posit that legislators are as apt to promote their own self
interest as anyone else. 5 5 Accordingly, congressional decisions, instead of
reflecting coherent public policy, tend to redistribute wealth toward special
interest groups favored by the majority voting bloc of the legislature. The
earlier rhetoric of effectuating congressional intent, although still present to
some degree, has been substantially supplanted by a tendency to stress a
judge's obligation to refrain from intruding into the policymaking domain of
the political branches of government. 56 Under the Chevron decision, 5 7 the

practical effect of this self-restraint has been to defer to executive branch legal
interpretations as well as policymaking. This tendency toward deference has
been reinforced by a renewed confidence in the executive's accountability to
the general public and its capacity to develop coherent public policy, although
the rhetoric of capture theory can still be heard. 58 Finally, with respect to
environmental values themselves, the idea that the good state ought to prefer
any particular deployment of social resources to any other has been
undermined by the view that the good state should merely aggregate the
individual preferences of its citizens, according them all equal status. In that
case, there is no reason to treat environmental values as special. 59
B.

In the Beginning: Optimistic Pluralism, Agency Capture, and the
Special Value of Environmental Protection

1. Optimistic Pluralism: Legislation as Coherent Public Policy. By the time EPA
was established in 1970, the dominant working theory of American politics
was interest group pluralism.

60

Recently, the excesses of interest group

pluralism have been attacked by scholars who are attempting to revive
elements of civic republicanism in our country. 6i However, the shift we trace
is not between theories of pluralism and neorepublicanism, but rather a shift
55. See text accompanying notes 164-86.
56. See text accompanying notes 203-66.
57. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v NRDC, 467 US 827 (1984).
58. See text accompanying notes 203-50.
59. See text accompanying notes 187-202.
60. See, for example, William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation, Scholarship, and Pedagogy
in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U Pitt L Rev 691, 697 (1987) ("In the 1950s, pluralism was accepted as
the 'best description of our polity.' "); See also Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism (W.W. Norton &
Co., 1978); Nicholas Miller, Pluralism and Social Choice, 77 Am Pol Sci Rev 734 (1983);John F. Manley,
Neo-Pluralism: A Class Analysis of Pluralism I and Pluralism II, 77 Am Pol Sci Rev 368, 368 (1983), citing
three general theories of political power-pluralism, elitism, and class analysis-and identifying
pluralism as "the most widely accepted theory." Robert A. Dahl's Pluralist Democracy in the United
States was first published in 1967 (Rand McNally, 1967).
61. See, for example, Sunstein, 97 Yale LJ at 1542 (cited in note 4); Frank I. Michelman, Traces
of Self-Government, 100 Harv L Rev 4 (1986); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 Va L Rev 543 (1986). Professor Sunstein argues, however, that public
law doctrines are by no means completely consistent with interest-group pluralism; they retain many
elements that are more consistent with certain republican assumptions. See, for example, Cass R.
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan L Rev 29 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Public
Values, Private Interests and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 S Ct Rev 127.
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within pluralism itself, for it is this movement that has proven influential in
the turn away from aggressive judicial review.
The pluralism of the 1960s and 19 7 0s was a critical response to theories
postulating that practical power in American politics was concentrated in the
hands of elites. In contrast, pluralism offered an understanding in which
changing coalitions of minorities ruled from time to time and from issue to
issue, without single coalitions being able to concentrate power across issues
or long enough to accumulate dangerous amounts of power.
This analysis of the actual distribution of power supported two optimistic
conclusions about the legislation that would issue from a pluralist polity.
First, although discrete minorities might from time to time succeed in
enacting patently self-serving legislation, 6 2 legislation typically would reflect a
roughly reasonable equilibrium of the relevant interests, as minority groups
jockeyed and compromised in order to assemble a working majority. This
result was perceived to be a fair compromise in most instances:
Every statute tends to represent compromise because the process of accommodating
conflicts of group interests is one of deliberation and consent. The legislative vote on
any issue tends to represent the composition of strength, i.e., the balance of power,
among contending groups at the time of voting. What may be called public policy is
63
the equilibrium reached in this struggle at any given moment ....

Second, while on any one issue some groups would obviously lose, changing
coalitions across issues indicated that the disadvantages created by any single
piece of legislation were not cumulative across all legislation. In Who Governs?,
Robert Dahl asked, "Are the inequalities in resources of influence [on the
political decisionmaking process] 'cumulative' or 'noncumulative'?" In a
pluralist society, he concluded, these inequalities will be noncumulative,
suggesting that legislative outcomes over time will not mass inequalities on

64
any single sector or group of sectors of the society.
The dynamics of conflict resolution mapped out by such optimistic
pluralism alleviate the concern that majority rule might trample minority
interests. By purporting to explain how American majoritarianism operates in
practice, pluralism thus addresses James Madison's concern about majority
factions. 6 5 Dahl captured this comforting thought when he concluded that,

62. The classic example, exposed by an equally classic study, is the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of
1930. See Elmer E. Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures and the Tariff (Prentice Hall, 1935).
63. Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics 35 (Cornell U Press, 1952). See also Sunstein, 97 Yale
LJ at 1542-43 (cited in note 4) (Under pluralism, "various groups in society compete for loyalty and
support from citizens. Once they are organized and aligned, they exert pressure on political
representatives, who respond, in market-like fashion, to the pressures thus exerted. The ultimate
result is political equilibrium.").
64. Robert A. Dahl, 1I'ho Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City 7, 85 (Yale U Press,
1961).
65. More generally, some pluralists apparently assumed that the results of clashes of specific
interests would be generally sound public policy. See, for example, Lowi, The End of Liberalism at 47
(cited in note 60) ("Pluralists believe that pluralist competition tends toward an equilibrium, and
therefore that its involvement with government can mean only good. Use of government is simply
one of many ways groups achieve equilibrium. Pluralist equilibrium is really the public interest.");
Eskridge & Frickey, 48 U Pitt L Rev at 697 n16 (cited in note 60).
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while the American democracy may be formally constituted to enable majority
rule, "specific policies tend to be the products of 'minorities rule.' "66
If pluralism is fundamentally concerned with the interactions among
groups and in the conditions for governing in contexts of dispersed power,
some pluralists have been faulted for not providing adequate explanation for
the role of elected and governing officials in the processes of group
interaction. 6 7 Political scientists, most notably Charles Lindblom, responded
to this omission by revising pluralist theory to account for the government
itself as a distinct participant in community decisionmaking. Even earlier,
however, legal scholarship was developing a theory of the role of the
legislator in formulating policy that proved influential in the judiciary's view
of the agency-judiciary relationship. An entire generation of lawyers and
judges had their understanding of that relationship shaped by the Legal
Process school, largely through courses that delved into materials by the same
name written by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks of Harvard Law School. 6 s
Accepting many of pluralism's insights on the influence of interest groups
on legislative outcomes, Hart and Sacks added another important ingredient:
the reasonable legislator. They urged that one should assume, in the absence
of specific evidence to the contrary, "that the legislature was made up of
reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.- 69 For those
who might otherwise find pluralism's belief in accommodating equilibria a
little mysterious, reasonable legislators provided an explanation for how
66. Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 133 (U Chicago Press, 1956). Dahl's pluralism
was much more than a wooden theory of interest group interaction. He stressed that social
consensus on fundamental values was crucial to the workings of American democracy, because that
consensus ensured that policy choices to be made in the formal political process were already preselected to be within a zone of acceptability to the majority of the electorate.
[T]he specific policies selected by a process of "minorities rule" probably lie most of the
time within the bounds of consensus set by the important values of the politically active
members of the society ....
In a sense what we describe as democratic "politics" is merely
the chaff. It is the surface manifestation, representing superficial conflicts. Prior to politics,
beneath it, enveloping it, restricting it, conditioning it, is the underlying consensus on
policy that usually exists in the society.
Id at 132. In Dahl's view, the main guarantor of a healthy democracy was this social consensus,
rather than the formal legal rules of the Constitution. Id at 134-35. In this regard, of course, Dahl's
pluralism could claim roots in Madison, who told the Virginia Ratifying Convention that "[tlo
suppose that any form of government will secure liberty or happiness without any virtue in the
people, is a chimerical idea." Jonathan Elliott, III, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the
Adoption of the FederalConstitution 537 (Burt Franklin reprints, 1974).
67. See, for example, Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Curreitt
Research, in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rieschmeyer & Theda Skocpol, eds, Bringing the State Back In
(Cambridge U Press, 1985); Grant Jordan, The Pluralism of Pluralism: An Anti-Theory, 38 Pol Stud 286,
292 (1990) (contrasting Charles Lindblom's attention to the role of government with its neglect by
others); Martin Smith, Pluralism, Reformed Pluralismand ,eopluralism: the Role of Pressure Groups in Policy,
Mfaking, 38 Pol Stud 302, 308 (1990) ("The major pluralists' studies of policy-making ... concentrate
on the behavior and organization of groups and so pay insufficient attention to the interests and
activities of the bureaucracy and government. They do not fully recognize the ability of state actors
to make policy autonomously of groups.").
68. William Eskridge and Philip Frickey provide an excellent summary of the influence of the
Legal Process school on law professors' understanding of the legislative process. Eskridge & Frickey,
48 U Pitt L Rev at 694-701 (cited in note 60).
69. Henry Hart & Albert Sacks, The Legal Process 14 14-15 (Cambridge, tentative edition 1958).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 54: No. 4

diverse interest group inputs were digested and translated into coherent
public policy.
Within the Legal Process paradigm, the legislature, at least some of the
time, performs a special kind of mediation role. Not only does the legislature
provide a venue in which competing interests might be traded off until some
compromise is reached, but lawmakers also synthesize the competing points
of view into a purposeful resolution of the conflict. These purposes in turn
give the courts "law to apply" beyond the specific, articulated details of the
70
statutory scheme.

Any statute written in general language will confront questions of detail
and application not expressly resolved by the language itself. Whenever this
occurs, the judge needs to decide how to proceed. The Legal Process school,
as well as most of the Legal Realists before that, believes it legitimate for
courts to decide such cases in light of statutory purposes. Doing so is thought
thoroughly consistent with the principle that legislators make laws and judges
merely apply them, for it is assumed that a reasonable legislator would want,
indeed insist, that her statutes and rules be interpreted in light of her
purposes. She would so insist because, unless she acted arbitrarily, she in fact
enacted the statutes and rules with criteria or purposes in mind, which she
thinks superior to any substitutes. 7 1 In circumstances where the statute does
70. Eskridge and Frickey stress that the Hart and Sacks assumption that legislators are
reasonable "was critically important ... because it affirmed the objectivity, indeed the legitimacy, of
legal rules." Eskridge & Frickey, 48 U Pitt L Rev at 695 (cited in note 60). That assumption,
however, only affirms the legitimacy of legal rules that purport to reason from purposes, as in fact
many judicial opinions do. Originalists offer another view of the purposes-objectivity relationship,
one which might be termed a rule of parsimonious construction: because legislation has no purpose
other than to seal interest group deals, the only objectively correct manner for a judge to resolve
some question of interpretation is to choose the result that best leaves private conduct untouched by
the statute. This rule may be considered objective, given the premises of the argument, namely a
presumption in favor of private autonomy and an assumption of an irrational legislative process.
Thus the reasonableness assumption is not necessary for the defense of any legal rule as objective,
but only for such a defense of rules that purport to reason from purposes.
71. James Gordley, Legal Reasoning: An Introduction, 72 Cal L Rev 138, 142 (1984). Gordley
argues for a stronger proposition than is necessary for present purposes. He argues that even when
a statute is susceptible to a "mechanical" interpretation that "appl[ies] relevant rules in a logically
rigorous argument," id at 140, a legislator who believes the statute was justified by some nonarbitrary set of purposes or criteria would acknowledge that not following the statutory rules may
from time to time be more consistent with those purposes or criteria than following them. In such
cases, following or deviating from the rules should be a matter decided by the criteria and purposes
of the legislator-including, of course, criteria relevant to the question of whether deviating from the
rule is worse than following it, even though the specific case would come out differently if the
purposes and not the rule were followed. Such a course "should" be followed because that is the
course such a legislator would herself prefer.
Indeed, [the] interpreters [of such a legislator] have no right to interpret their authority
mechanically and claim any validity for their result, since that is not how [the legislator]
wished to be interpreted. What they must do instead, when confronted with a set of rules, is
to ask by what criterion the rules were made. With this criterion in mind, they can be alert
for cases that would come out wrong according to the criterion though right according to
the rules. When these cases arise, they can ask whether their authority considered the
advantages and disadvantages of deviating from the rules to allow for the special
circumstances of the case. If he did not, they can consider the matter for themselves and act
accordingly.
Id at 145.
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not speak clearly, a legislator who enacted a statute with such discernible
criteria or purposes in mind would want the interpretational question
resolved by reference to those criteria or purposes, rather than in some other
way.
Clearly, for this interpretational approach to be available to judges, there
must be purposes to apply. The assumption of reasonable legislators acting
reasonably sanctions the judicial search for those purposes, for it posits that
these purposes will often be present. 72 The objective of judicial review of
agency action, therefore, is to define the limits of agency discretion afforded
by statutory delegations, in light of underlying statutory goals, and to ensure
that agencies such as EPA act within the bounds of those limits.

73

Exactly what judges should do to ensure agency fidelity to statutory
purposes was debated throughout the late 1960s and into the 1970s. Some
judges, such as Judge David Bazelon, favored confining EPA's discretion
solely through strengthening administrative procedures. 74 Others advocated
careful review of the substantive propriety of EPA's decisions. The latter
camp included Judge James Oakes of the Second Circuit, who remarked in
1977 that "a substantive judicial role is absolutely essential if judges are to
meet their serious constitutional obligation to check abuses of agency
discretion." ' 75 Another forceful champion of this view was Judge Harold
Leventhal. Although he conceded that "giving up" on the task of serious
substantive review would be an easy way out of the conundrum created by the
need to decide cases that could not be resolved by resort to the statutory text,
he insisted that this option was not legitimate. Substantive review was a
responsibility imposed on the courts by Congress, which had agreed to make
broad delegations of authority to agencies like EPA only because there is
judicial review "to assure that the agency exercises the delegated power
within statutory limits."

76

References to the courts' "responsibility" to review

EPA decisions to ensure consistency with legislative intent abound in the early
cases, in the context of deciding both statutory interpretation 7 7 and statutory
implementation issues. 78 One judge indicated in the latter context, for
72. See Cynthia Farina's analysis of the delegation doctrine decisions, arguing that the Court's
insistence that Congress articulate identifiable principles is necessary to maintain a distinction
between making and interpreting law. Such principles, which include purposes, provide a basis for
both agency and judicial interpretation. Farina, 89 Colum L Rev at 478-99 (cited in note 2). For
judicial application of this idea, see text accompanying note 84-88.
73. EDF v Ruckelshaus, 439 F2d at 593, 598.
74. Ethyl Corp., 541 F2d at 66-68.
75. James L. Oakes, Substantivejudicial Review in EnvironmentalLaw, 7 Envir L Rptr 50029, 50030
(1977).
76. Ethyl Corp., 541 F2d at 68. See also Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the
Role of the Courts, 122 U Pa L Rev 509, 555 (1974) ("The courts have been selected by Congress to
provide an 'independent review' of the decisions involved."). Indeed, Judge Leventhal hinted that
the courts would have to apply the nondelegation doctrine more rigorously if the courts' obligation
to engage in substantive review were not taken seriously. See Ethyl Corp., 541 F2d at 68.
77. InternationalHarvester, 478 F2d at 633; EDF v Ruckelshaus, 439 F2d at 596.
78. Environmental Defense Fund v EPA, 465 F2d 528, 540-41 (DC Cir 1972) ("EDF v EPA");
Kennecott Copper Corp. v EPA, 462 F2d 846, 848 (DC Cir 1972); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v FPC,
354 F2d 608, 612 (2d Cir 1965).
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example, that "[a] court would abdicate its function" if it did not set
"parameters of rationality within which the agency must operate." 79
In the early cases involving challenges to EPA's interpretation and
implementation of statutes, the courts routinely referred to the underlying
legislative "purposes" to resolve those challenges. According to Judge
Leventhal, "[i]n ascertaining congressional intent we begin with the language
of the statute, but this is subject to an overriding requirement of looking to all
sources including purposes and legislative history, to ascertain discernible
legislative purpose." ' 0 Ascertaining such a purpose took priority not only
over the policy of upholding reasonable interpretations by agencies in the

absence of "other discernible legislative intent,""' but even over adherence
82
to the plain meaning doctrine.
Though they recognized that Congress had been forced by the scope and
complexity of the task at hand, and by its inability to foresee all possible
contingencies, to delegate broadly to agencies charged with implementing
environmental protection statutes, the courts nevertheless ascertained
"benchmarks" to guide agencies and courts in determining whether or not
the former were exceeding their powers.8 3 Although it did not involve EPA,
the landmark Overton Park84 case set the tone for this kind of analysis in future
environmental disputes. The plaintiffs claimed that the Secretary of
Transportation's decision to finance the construction of a highway through a
public park violated a statute that permitted such construction only in the
absence of feasible and prudent alternatives to the use of park land. The
secretary argued that the statute vested in him considerable discretion on the
issues of "prudence" and "feasibility" and that the courts should defer to the
exercise of that discretion. The Court, however, perceived in the legislation a
desire to elevate the protection of park land to a level of "paramount
importance.''85 The Court thus interpreted a statute that arguably required
the secretary to balance a variety of factors8 6 as leaving to him "only a small
range of choices" 8 7-highways could be routed through parks only in the
most unusual situations. Given that limited discretion, the Court concluded
79. South Terminal Corp. v EPA, 504 F2d 646, 665 (1st Cir 1974).
80. Portland Cement Ass'n v Ruckelshaus, 486 F2d 375, 379-80 (DC Cir 1973).
81. International Harvester, 478 F2d at 639.
82. PortlandCement Ass'n, 486 F2d at 380 n 13 (" 'The "plain meaning" doctrine has always been
subservient to a truly discernible legislative purpose however discerned,' by equitable construction
or recourse to legislative history."), citing Wilderness Society v Morton, 479 F2d 942 (DC Cir 1973);
District of Columbia v Orleans, 406 F2d 957, 959 (DC Cir 1968). See also Getty Oil Co (Eastern Operations)
v Ruckelshaus, 467 F2d 349, 356 (3d Cir 1972), where the court noted its agreement with "Justice
Frankfurter's admonition that '[sitatutes ... are instruments of government, and in construing them
"the general purpose is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal
logic may lay down." This is so because the purpose of an enactment is embedded in its words even
though it is not always expressed in words.' ", quoting United States v Shire),, 359 US 255, 260-61
(1958).
83. South Terminal Corp., 504 F2d at 677.
84. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc: v Volpe, 401 US 402 (1971).
85. Id at 412-13.
86. See Harry J. Kalen, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 Harv L Rev 3, 324 (1971).
87. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 US at 416.
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that the secretary had not justified adequately his departure from the basic
88
goal of park land protection.
The lower courts soon followed the lead of Overton Park by engaging in
similar efforts to ferret out overarching statutory purposes. For example, the
District of Columbia Circuit was called upon to assess the legality of EPA's
regulations limiting the lead content of gasoline, issued under a provision of
the Clean Air Act authorizing regulation of additives that "will endanger" the
public health or welfare. 89 The issue was the quantum of proof of
endangerment required to justify regulation, a matter that the statute did not
resolve explicitly. The court upheld the regulations despite the absence of a
threshold factual finding that the uncontrolled emissions would cause harm,
because, in the court's view, the "policy guidelines ...

largely set, both in the

statutory term 'will endanger' and in the relationship of that term to other
sections of the Clean Air Act," supported regulation. 90
Once they ascertained the "public policies" that permeated a statutory
scheme, the courts in the early cases displayed little reluctance to apply those
policies to situations that Congress itself never considered. One such case
involved review of EPA's refusal to grant to automobile manufacturers a oneyear suspension of emission standards. 9 ' According to the court, Congress
did not specifically address the question of whether such a suspension would
be appropriate when a refusal to grant it would cause grave economic harm,
whereas a grant would probably cause minimal environmental damage. This
congressional silence, however, required neither blind deference to the
balance struck by EPA nor judicial paralysis:
As we see it, the issue must be viewed as one of legislative intent. And since there is

neither express wording or [sic] legislative history on the precise issue, the intent must
be imputed. The court must seek to discern and reconstruct what the legislature that
enacted the statute would have contemplated for the court's action if it could have
been able to foresee the precise situation. It is in this perspective that we have not
flinched from our discussion of the economic
and technological risks inherent in a
"wrong decision" by the Administrator. 9 2

In another case, the issue was whether EPA was exempt from the National
Environmental Policy Act's ("NEPA's") requirement to prepare an
environmental impact statement in issuing emission standards for new
stationary sources under the Clean Air Act. 9 3 The court concluded that EPA
was exempt because, even though there was no evidence that Congress
considered the precise question, an exemption would best serve NEPA's main
purpose of protecting the environment. 9 4 In the process, the court quoted
88.
89.

Id at 419.
Ethyl Corp., 541 F2d at 1.

90.

Id at 29.

91.

International tanester, 478 F2d 615.

92.

Id at 648.

93.
94.

Portland Cement Ass'n, 486 F2d at 375.
Id at 383. Requiring an impact statement, in the court's view, presented the danger that

opponents of environmental protection would use the issue of compliance as a delay tactic. Id at
384.
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Justice Harlan's guiding "axiom" that, "courts should endeavor to give
statutory language that meaning that nurtures the policies underlying
legislation . . .when circumstances not plainly covered by the terms of the

statute are subsumed by the underlying policies to which Congress was
committed." 9 5 In like fashion, the Supreme Court relied in part on the Clean
Air Act's underlying objective of "technology forcing" to conclude that EPA
lacked the authority to reject a state implementation plan under that act on
the grounds that it was economically or technologically infeasible. 96 That the
courts need not resort to the agency to supply the "law to apply" in such
situations seemed obvious. 97 Indeed, the courts recognized that reliance on
the agency to supply the law ran the risk of subverting the policies discernible
in statutory enactments, since the agency might elevate some of the
competing interests fused in the legislative crucible at the expense of others.
In summary, in the early years of EPA, an optimistic brand of pluralism
was the reigning political theory in the United States. The theory lent a
soothing imprimatur to the actions of legislatures, indicating that the interests
of competing groups could be melded together in a coherent fashion to
produce moderate, conflict reducing, public policy. As we have seen, the
theory was incorporated into judicial attitudes toward legislation, which were
treated as generally coherent, purposive acts that simultaneously reflected
competing interests and composed them into reasonable treatments of their
subject matter. This understanding of the nature of politics underwrote
aggressive judicial review of agency decisions. 98
2. Agency Capture. While optimistic pluralism plays an indispensable role in
understanding the political theory of the judiciary during EPA's earliest days,
it is by no means the complete picture. Running alongside it was the much
more gloomy theory of agency capture. While optimistic pluralism was either
a general theory of governance in a society of dispersed power and interest
groups with overlapping interests or else a theory that concentrated on
legislative decisionmaking, agency capture theory concentrated on
95. Id at 383 n36. See also id at 380 ("In statutory interpretation, the courts must often, in
effect, consider what answer the legislature would have made as to a problem that was neither
discussed nor contemplated.").
96. Union Electric Company v EPA, 427 US 246, 268-69 (1976).
97. See Panel, Environmental Decision-Making: The Agencies Versus the Courts, 7 Nat Res L 339, 356
(1974) (remarks ofJudge Leventhal) (Courts in environmental cases serve the important function of
"providing a larger perspective, a coordinating perspective of the balancing" of legislative policies.).
98. In this section, we have been summarizing general tendencies, not universal rules. Even in
EPA's earliest years, the federal judiciary was thoroughly aware that significant provisions of
important legislation, including environmental legislation, may be the result of many considerations
other than a clear-headed resolution of public purpose. Judges realized that statutes may embody
Congress's "quick answer ... to a legislative stalemate," Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v
Hodgson, 499 F2d 467 (DC Cir 1974), or they may reflect a deliberate delegation of policymaking
authority to the agency, or they may indicate that Congress failed to perceive an issue that has
subsequently emerged as significant. Granting this, the opinions of the early 1970s suggest that
judges approached questions of statutory interpretation with something like a rebuttable
presumption that they could discern the correct resolution from a combination of express statutory
language, statutory structure, and statutory purpose.
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decisionmaking within the bureaus and administrative agencies that had
become indispensable to the operations of the federal government since the
New Deal.
The administrative state had been born at a time of national crisis, as
agencies charged with managing the economy had been thought essential to
the recovery from the Great Depression. It then passed through a period of
relatively enthusiastic acceptance as a permanent, meliorating addition to the
structures of government. By the 1970s, however, that enthusiasm had worn
very thin. After beginning sporadically in the 1950s, the attacks on the
regulatory state that were later assembled under the umbrella of "agency
capture" became "widespread and profound" in the 1960s. 99
Capture theorists argued that transferring governmental authority into the
hands of regulatory agencies would, sooner or later, put the foxes in charge of
the chicken coop. Capture theory began with a set of trenchant empirical
observations about how older regulatory agencies had evolved from agencies
allegedly charged with ensuring the public interest against the predations of
the regulated industry, to commissions that developed a deep stake in the
well-being of the regulated industry itself and thus began to be at least as
protective of and beneficial to the objects of their regulation as they were to
the public at large.100

By the 1960s, the empirical studies of agency performance still remained
without a completely convincing account of why capture occurred. Mancur
Olson's seminal study of "the logic of collective action"''
provided these
analyses with just such a statement of the underlying mechanism of, and
hence explanation for, the process whereby bureaus "came to be conceived of
10 2
as a method of subsidizing private interests at the expense of public good."
Olson observed that large groups of individuals, each of whose stake in the
results of collective action may be quite small, are at a distinct disadvantage
compared to smaller groups of more intensely interested individuals. For the
former, the problem of free-riding and the costs of coordination may make
collective action quite difficult, whereas groups of the latter description will
more easily surmount these difficulties.
When applied to the administrative state, the logic of collective action
proved devastating. Concerted, sustained action in the administrative arena
earns great rewards for the group that can engage in such activity. The group
becomes familiar with the procedures and workings of the bureau, friendly
with its staff, and perhaps relied upon for information and even advice. Its
arguments and concerns become familiar to the bureaucrats. Such groups are
99. John Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 Harv L Rev 713, 723 (1986). See
generally, Robert C. Felimeth, The Interstate Commerce Comission: The Public Interest and the ICC
(Grossman, 1970).
100. For example, Marver H. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission 86-95
(Princeton U Press, 1955); Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism 3, 59, 283 (Quadrangle Books,
1963).
101. Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (Schocken Books, 1965).
102. Wiley, 99 Harv L Rev at 723 (cited in note 99).
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also able to hire more effective counsel and experts than more diffuse groups.
The cumulative result of these advantages, all the product of these groups'
cohesiveness, is that bureau decisions tend to favor the small, concentrated
0 3
group. 1
Capture theorists developed their arguments by studying the older
economic regulatory agencies. Generally, these agencies operated under
statutes from the New Deal era or earlier that charged them to administer
affairs "in the public interest." As the regulatory arena became visualized as a
battleground in which competing economic interests vied for interpretive
superiority concerning general statutory mandates, it became easy for
observers, including judges, to see how the dynamics of the capture theory
had room to operate. Courts began to view agency proceedings with
suspicion, and the bureaucracies' assertions that they were watching out for
the interest of the disorganized public were no longer taken as dispositive. As
the District of Columbia Circuit said in- Office of Communication of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC:
The theory that the Commission can always effectively represent the listener interests
in a renewal proceeding . . . is one of those assumptions we collectively try to work
with so long as they are reasonably adequate. When it becomes clear, as it does to us
now, that it is no longer
a valid assumption . . .neither we nor the Commission can
0 4
continue to rely on it.1

EPA did not escape this increasingly suspicious judicial mind-set.
Legislators, judges, and academics alike called for judicial "supervision"' 10 5 of
EPA's performance to combat the agency's susceptibility to capture by special
interests whose objectives did not coincide with legislative policy. Because
"[i]t cannot be assumed that EPA will always be the good guy,"' 0 6 judicial
review would enable the courts in appropriate circumstances to "police the
police." 0 7 According to Judge Leventhal, Congress empowered the courts to
oversee the exercise of EPA's delegated power because a "court, isolated as it
is from political pressures .... would be a more suitable forum for review than
103. See Stewart, 88 Harv L Rev at 1685-88, 1713-15 (cited in note 3).
104. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v FCC, 359 F2d 994, 1003-04 (DC Cir
1966).
105. Leventhal, 122 U Pa L Rev at 511 (cited in note 76); Panel, 7 Nat Res L at 352 (cited in note
97) (remarks of Judge Leventhal).
106. Portland Cement Ass'n, 486 F2d at 384, quoting 118 Cong Reg 16878, 16887 (Oct 4, 1972)
(remarks of Sen. Jackson).
107. Id. The court also quoted from the 1972 National Wildlife Federal Conservation Report:
"it cannot be forgotten that EPA is a regulatory agency and in the past in Washington almost all
regulatory agencies have eventually come under the control of those that they are charged with
regulating." Id at 384 n39. The same concern surfaced in the literature. See, for example, Richard
B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-constitutional Law in Judicial Review of
Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 Iowa L Rev 713, 719-20 (1977) (the
dedication of EPA's pesticide division to the statutory goal of environmental protection is suspect
because it is a spinoff of the Agriculture Department, which was historically insensitive to
environmental concerns). See also Richard B. Stewart & James E. Krier, Environmental Law & PolicV
620-21 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1978) (Agencies making decisions involving competing values are
increasingly viewed as biased in favor of certain interest groups, creating pressure on courts "to go
beyond the traditional model of judicial review in order to control agency discretion in policy
making.").
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even the Congress."' 0 8 While EPA may depart from statutory directives
because of pressure applied by either industry-based or environmentalist
interest groups,' 0 9 the courts, at least in some of the federal circuits,'10
seemed more concerned about the agency's proclivity to give insufficient
weight to the concerns of environmental interests."'
Once the assumption that an agency would fairly represent the interests of
the unorganized public had been dropped, the dominant response of the
federal judiciary was to seek means to introduce more adequate forms of
representation into the administrative process. A variety of doctrinal
developments in the 1960s and 1970s had this effect, including expanding the
range of legally protected interests recognized under the doctrines of
standing and permitting surrogate standing." 12 These new representatives of
the public also needed effective access to the bureaucratic proceedings that
preceded judicial review. Accordingly, the courts expanded intervention
rights and suggested that disorganized interests might even be able to compel
an agency to initiate an administrative proceeding. The 1965 Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. FPC case, in which the Second Circuit reviewed the
Federal Power Commission's issuance of a license to build a hydroelectric
plant in a scenic area along the Hudson River, set the stage for these
developments.' 13 In overturning the agency's licensing decision for failure to
engage in a complete study of alternatives, the court stated that it would
require agencies purporting to represent the public interest to act
affirmatively to protect the rights of the public.' "4 The courts later extended
this notion that environmental interests might be underrepresented in agency
deliberations into the context ofjudicial review of EPA decisions, even though
the primary mission of EPA, unlike those of development-oriented agencies
l 5
such as the FPC, was protection of the environment.'
108. International Harvester, 478 F2d at 633. See also, William F. Pedersen, Formal Records and
Informal Rulemaking, 85 Yale LJ 38, 60 (1975) (noting that courts alone have the freedom from
political considerations that is necessary to a dispassionate and effective review of complex and
controversial environmental issues).
109. Leventhal, 122 U Pa L Rev at 531 (cited in note 76) (The "dominant question" for a court
reviewing action taken by an environmental agency is whether there has been sufficient consideration
of nonenvironmental factors.); Stewart, 62 Iowa L Rev at 725 (cited in note 107) (Judicial review
under the Clean Air Act has enlarged EPA's discretion by requiring consideration of economic and
social costs of controlling pollution.). See also text accompanying note 159.
110. See text accompanying notes 153, 159.
111. See, for example, note 107.
112. For a summary of these doctrinal changes, see Stewart, 88 Harv L Rev at 1723-48 (cited in
note 3).
113. Scenic Hudson, 354 F2d at 608.
114. Idat 620.
115. See Stewart & Krier, Environmental Law & Policy at 621 (cited in note 107), contending that in
order to respond to charges of agency bias in favor of regulated industries, courts sought to ensure
the representation of all affected interests, including environmental and other loosely organized
"public interests," in agency decisional processes. The courts' aim was "to enhance agency
responsiveness to all of the various constituencies with a stake in their decisions." Id. See also
Stewart, 62 Iowa L Rev at 719 (cited in note 107); Panel, 7 Nat Res L at 369 (cited in note 97)
(remarks of Grant P. Thompson) (Judges take their role in reviewing agency decisions involving
environmental issues seriously, in part because these issues "affect people unrepresented,
generations unborn, and ecosystems without a vote.").
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In order to level the playing field between industry and environmentalist
concerns, thereby reducing the prospects for agency capture, the courts
indicated that they would "go further" than in other contexts "in requiring
the agency to establish a decisionmaking process adequate to protect the
interests of all 'consumers' of the natural environment."' 16 Accordingly, the
courts steeped themselves in the process of assessing the adequacy of EPA's
procedures, and often found them wanting. They required EPA, for example,
to disclose for comment the data and methodology relied upon in formulating
a proposed rule,"17 to expand the administrative record by providing detailed
statements of its reasoning along with proposed and final rules,"i 8 to respond
to significant comments received in response to proposed rules," l9 and to
afford opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses,' 20 even though they
conceded in some instances that these requirements could not be traced
either to the Administrative Procedure Act or to any of EPA's organic
statutes.'

2

These procedural innovations were designed to improve the logic and
coherence of agency decisionmaking, to ensure, insofar as procedures can
accomplish this, that the agency had taken a "hard look" at the full range of
affected interests before acting, 22 and to facilitate judicial review.' 23 All of
these mechanisms would assist the courts in preventing the agency from
derailing the achievement of the protective initiatives reflected in the early
environmental legislation.
3. Environmental Values as Special. In 1975, Richard Stewart published an
important analysis of administrative law, in which he argued that the
combination of the political theories of agency capture and interest group
pluralism had already precipitated a "reformation" of administrative law from
its earlier New Deal and Post-World War II beginnings. In addition, he
argued that we had become disabused of the view that the legislature could
write discernible public values and principles into law that the courts could
116. InternationalHarvester, 478 F2d at 651. See also Ruckelshaus, 439 F2d at 594-95 (requiring
public hearing into whether pesticide registration should be suspended so that the public could be
brought into the decisionmaking process).
117. See Portland Cement Ass'n, 486 F2d at 392-94; International Harvester, 478 F2d at 631-32.
118. South Terminal Corp., 504 F2d at 665; PortlandCement Ass"n, 486 F2d at 384-86; Kennecott Copper
Coip., 462 F2d at 849; EDF v Ruckelshaus, 439 F2d at 596.
119. PortlandCement Ass'n, 486 F2d at 394.
120. InternationalHarvester, 478 F2d at 649.
121. Portland Cement Ass'n, 486 F2d at 386, 400 n95; International Harvester, 478 F2d at 651-52;
Kennecott Copper Corp., 462 F2d at 850 & n18 (in particular cases, fairness may require more than the
minimum procedures specified in the APA).
122. The term "hard look" was coined by Judge Leventhal in Greater Boston Television Corp, 444
F2d at 851. Environmental decisions quickly became one of the major areas in which hard look
review was applied vigorously. See generally Leventhal, 122 U Pa L Rev 509 (cited in note 76). A
succinct summary of the elements of hard look review is contained in Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation
and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1984 Sup Ct Rev 177, 181-84.
123. InternationalHarvester, 478 F2d at 651; Pederson, 85 Yale LJ at 77 (cited in note 108). See
also Panel, 7 Nat Res L at 369-70 (cited in note 97) (remarks of Grant P. Thompson) (increased
procedural requirements help to expose sloppy decisionmaking to public criticism and to encourage
openness and reasoned analysis).
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then superintend. As he put it, "[e]xposure on the one hand to the
complexities of a managed economy in a welfare state, and on the other to the
corrosive seduction of welfare economics and pluralist political analysis, has
sapped faith in the existence of an objective basis for social choice.' 2 4 This
loss of faith translated into a new view of administrative discretion. Because
we "doubt[ed] the very existence of an ascertainable 'national welfare' as a
meaningful guide to administrative decision," we had begun to view the
exercise of that discretion "as the essentially legislative process of adjusting
the competing claims of various private interests affected by agency
25
policy." 1

By interpreting theories of capture and pluralism in this way, however,
Stewart had gotten ahead of the historical story. He was anticipating a more
radical shift in political assumptions than had yet taken place within the
judiciary or within the broad spectrum of political analysis throughout the
country. Specifically, throughout the 1960s and well into the 1970s, the
country developed and maintained a commitment to environmental
protection as a significant public value, one not reducible to the agenda of
special interests intent on capturing administrative agencies.
In their initial formulations, neither pluralist nor capture theories had
anything to say about whether the values being pursued in the political arena
were truly public values or merely aspects of some private agenda. Each
began as an empirical theory of decisionmaking in situations of value conflict,
taking the existence of pluralistic disagreement as a fact and exploring how
decisions are made in the face of the conflicts that a pluralistic society
produces. 12 6 As theories of conflict resolution, neither necessarily took a
position on the origins or status of those conflicting values. In particular,
neither theory presupposed that values are subjective or exclusively private,
although individual pluralist or capture theorists may in fact have embraced
27
the public choice claim that all values are necessarily subjective.'
Indeed, such agnosticism probably eased the assimilation of both theories
into mainstream political thought, because notwithstanding the sophistication
124. Stewart, 88 Harv L Rev at 1683 (cited in note 3).
125. Id.
126. See text accompanying notes 62-66, 99-103.
127. See, for example, Wiley, 99 Harv L Rev at 725 n58 (cited in note 99) (tracing the public
choice argument to the work of Kenneth Arrow). The idea that there are no objective values, and
hence no objective bases for social choice, is a claim about the status, or ontology, of values that has
become closely identified with the theory of public choice. Public choice theory attempts to "[apply]
economics to political science. The basic behavioral postulate of public choice, as for economics, is
that man is an egoistic, rational utility maximizer." Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice: A Survey, 14J
Econ Lit 395 (1976), reprinted in James M. Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison, eds, The Theory of Public
Choice - 11 23, 23 (U Mich Press, 1984). Within that paradigm, any values that influence an
individual's choices are connected to his or her utility in ways that are determined subjectively by that
individual. Even when an individual is thinking about so-called "public issues," the value he or she
places on any particular resolution of the issue connects to his or her utility in a subjectively
determined way. There are, on this account, no objective values.
Lately, the public choice idea and the pluralist and capture theory lessons about the mechanisms
of collective action have merged into a new breed of pluralist theory, which can be labelled
"pessimistic pluralism." This phenomenon is described at text accompanying notes 164-76.
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of many academics and judges in appreciating capture theory and in accepting
pluralism, in EPA's early years, the "public interest" was still considered a
coherent concept, and environmental values were still widely viewed as being
a crucial part of that public interest. 128 Environmental values were viewed as
"special," but in the old-fashioned sense of distinct or unique. The
environment had not yet been downgraded in status to that of just another
private interest.'

29

The special status of environmental values had three distinct elements.
First, retrieving or maintaining high environmental quality was thought to be
in everyone's interests. Like national defense, and unlike the distribution of
broadcast licenses, the aspect of environmental quality emphasized most was
that it was a public good, valued and to be valued by everyone. As Judge
Bazelon reminded his colleagues in a case challenging regulation under the
Clean Air Act, "we are dealing here not with an airline's fares or a
broadcaster's wattage, but with all humanity's interest in life, health and a
30
harmonious relationship with the elements of nature."'
This is not to deny that some groups benefitted more than others from
decisions to improve environmental quality or from the particular
implementation strategies chosen. Again, the situation is similar to national
defense, where decisions whether to upgrade the Navy or the Air Force will
differentially benefit the Electric Boat Company or McDonnell Douglas. The
existence of private benefits does not, however, vitiate the status of national
defense as a public value. Thinking it does would, among other things, be
inconsistent with the conceptions of the Constitution's framers. Madison, for
instance, believed that citizens could deliberate upon and choose directions
that conduced to the "collective and permanent welfare." Yet Madison knew
that policies pursuing that welfare would benefit some people in society more
than others. For example, he predicted that substantial inequalities of wealth
would result in a country that respected individual liberty-and liberty was
certainly one necessary ingredient in the country's collective and permanent
3
welfare. ' '

Analogously, improving environmental quality was thought to be a
direction in which we should move for the good of the country as a whole.
This belief was reflected in public opinion polls. "Environmental protection
had become a consensual issue by 1970, as majorities of the public expressed
128. See, for example, Rabin, 38 Stan L Rev at 1278-95 (cited in note 3) (describing in "public
interest" terms the broad effort of the 1970s to free agency decisionmaking from capture and to
reclaim public policy for true public interests).
129. See, for example, id at 1303:
In one way or another, key enactments like the Endangered Species Act, the amendments to
the Department of Transportation Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the
Clean Air Act appeared to treat conservation, health, or safety, as the case might be, as a
preferred value rather than a consideration of equivalent weight to the economic benefits of
regulation.
130. IniernationalHarvester, 478 F2d at 615.
131. The Federalist No. 10 (Madison), In Jacob Cooke, ed, The Federalist 56-65 (Wesleyan U Press,
1961).
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pro-environment opinions and typically only small minorities expressed
opinions in the anti-environment direction."' 13 2 It was also reflected in hightone, perhaps unrealistic, rhetoric and in the outpouring of new federal
legislation that dramatically restructured the federal role in environmental
decisionmaking.
The second element of the distinctive status of environmental quality was
that it was treated as an individual right as well as a public good. In this
regard, environmental quality was viewed more like civil rights than national
defense. To the extent environmental quality is a right, it is an inappropriate
candidate for trading off with "mere" interests, such as firm profits, property
values, or even wage rates. Again, one piece of evidence for this claim is the
public rhetoric of the time, both inside and outside the public arena. A
momentary push was even made to constitutionalize a right to environmental
quality.'

33

Further support for the "rights" view of environmental quality can be
found in the major pollution control statutes enacted at the time. Whereas
the economic/public choice view of environmental quality insists that
environmental controls be calibrated to balance their benefits with their costs,
the Clean Air Act enacted nationally uniform ambient air quality standards,
and the Clean Water Act enacted an objective of zero discharge of pollutants
into the nation's waters by 1985.134 Other provisions, such as the point
source limitations under the CWA and the stationary source standards under
the CAA, recognized feasibility as a constraint, but did so in circumstances in
which the assumption seemed to be that feasibility limited controls would go
35
well beyond the point mandated by cost-benefit analyses.
Finally, environmental quality was considered special in the sense that on
more and more occasions the burden of justification was being placed on
those who argued against environmental protection, not, as was more typical
1
under the regime of the common law, on those who argued in favor of it. 36
Federal statutes were read not simply to establish specific programs, but to
provide discernible purposes. Thus, in Overton Park, the Court found fault
with the secretary of transportation's decision to route a highway through a
public park, given a series of recent statutes "designed to curb the
accelerating destruction of our country's natural beauty,"' 3 7 including one
statute which the Court characterized as placing "paramount importance" on
132. Riley E. Dunlap, Public Opinion and Environmental Policy, in James P. Lester, ed, Environmental
Politics and Policy 87, 98 (Duke U Press, 1989).
133. See, for example, John C. Esposito, Air and Water Pollution: WIhat to Do While IW'aiting for
Washington, 5 Harv Civ Rts-Civ Lib L Rev 32, 45-51 (1970).
134. 42 USC § 7409; 33 USC § 1311.
135. Id § 7411; 33 USC § 1311.
136. For example, Martin H. Belsky, Environmental Policy' Law in the 1980s: Shifting Back the Burden
of Proof, 12 Envir L Q 1, 5-26 (1984); James E. Krier, Environmental Litigation and the Burden of Proof, in
Malcolm F. Baldwin &James K. Page, Jr., eds, Lau) and The Environment 105 (Walker, 1970).
137. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 US at 404.
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McGowan:

8

[Vol. 54: No. 4

More generally, according to Judge

[h]itherto the right of the polluter was pre-eminent, unless the damage caused by
pollution could be proved. Henceforth, the right of the public to a clean environment
would be pre-eminent, unless pollution treatment was impractical or unachievable....
This new view of relative rights ... was based on the widely shared conviction that the
nation's quality of life depended on its natural bounty, and that
it was worth incurring
3 9
heavy cost to preserve that bounty for future generations.1

Judge McGowan's colleague on the District of Columbia Circuit, Judge
Wright, put the matter more briefly. The idea, he said, was "to err on the side
40
of caution."
4. The Upshot. Optimistic pluralism, agency capture, and the special status
of environmental values combined to give judicial review of EPA actions its
distinctive early form. During the first few years of EPA's existence, in the
midst of a vigorous debate about the proper role of the courts in reviewing
agency decisions,' 4 ' judges tended to emphasize the need to ensure that
admiristrative decisions conformed to congressional intent. 4 2 During this
time, the courts for the most part viewed Congress as the most accountable of
the three branches. Agency decisions, because they were made by unelected
officials, depended for their legitimacy on abiding by standards established by
Congress, if there were any. 143 But agency decisionmakers were viewed as
susceptible to capture by special interests, and thus as prone to subvert
legislative programs. Accordingly, in defining the limits of judicial functions,
the courts stressed their obligation to ferret out agency decisions that
contravened legislative intent.144
Reflecting the special status of environmental protection, the judiciary
interpreted the new environmental statutes as giving them "law to apply" in
cases in which environmental litigants challenged administrative action as not
sufficiently protective of the environment, public health, and safety. In
several important cases, the District of Columbia Circuit expressed the view
that it was "in a real sense part of the total administrative process." 4 5 Agency
138.

Idat413.

139.

Weyerhauser Co. v Costle, 590 F2d 1011 (DC Cir 1978).

140. Lead Industries Ass'n v EPA, 647 F2d 1130, 1155 (DC Cir 1980), cert denied, 449 US 1041
(1980).
141. See, for example, the concurring and dissenting opinions in Ethyl Corp., 541 F2d at 66, 69,
70.
142. The analysis in this part has focused primarily upon decisions rendered by the United States
Supreme Court and by the Federal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which
reviews the bulk of EPA regulatory decisions. See, for example, 42 USC § 7607(b)(1) (1988)
(petitions for review of certain EPA decisions under the Clean Air Act must be filed in the DC
Circuit); 42 USC § 6976(a)(1) (1988) (same under RCRA).
143. See RichardJ. Pierce, Sidney A. Shapiro & Paul R. Verkuil, Administrative Law and Process x-xi
(Foundation Press, 1985).
144. Id. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth
Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirenent of Adequate Reasons for Agency, Decisions, 1987 Duke L J

387, 394-95.
145.

Kennecott Copper Corp. v EPA, 462 F2d 846, 849 (DC Cir 1972), quoting Greater Boston Television

Corp. v FCC, 444 F 2d 841, 851-52, cert denied, 403 US 923 (1971).
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and court together constituted "a 'partnership' in furtherance of the public
interest,"'14 6 as reflected in the environmental legislation EPA was charged
with implementing. 4 7 The court's "responsibility" as a member of this
partnership was to act with restraint, yet provide "supervision" for EPA 148
"for the purpose of effectuating the legislative mandate." 1 4 9 In short, we had
entered a "new era"
[iun the history of the long and fruitful collaboration of administrative agencies and
reviewing courts. For many years, courts have treated administrative policy decisions
with great deference, confining judicial attention primarily to matters of procedure.
On matters of substance, the courts regularly upheld agency action, with a nod in the
direction of the "substantial evidence" test, and a bow to the mysteries of
administrative expertise. Courts occasionally asserted, but less often exercised, the
power to set aside agency action on the ground that an impermissible factor had
entered into the decision, or a crucial factor had not been considered. Gradually,
however, that power has come into more frequent use, and with it, the requirement
that administrators articulate the factors on which they base their decisions.
Strict adherence to that requirement is especially important now that the character of
administrative litigation is changing. . . . [C]ourts are increasingly asked to review
administrative action that touches on fundamental personal interests in life, health,
and liberty. These interests have always had a special claim to judicial protection, 50in
comparison with the economic interests in a ratemaking or licensing proceeding.'

Under the influence of this political worldview, the environmental decade
of the 1970s also became the decade of the "hard look" and the "soft glance,"
under which agency decisions disrespectful of environmental interests were
more likely to be subjected to intense judicial review and decisions in which
the agency had acted to protect the environment or public health under
conditions of uncertainty were more likely to receive more deferential
treatment.15 1 Despite concessions to the judiciary's lack of scientific and
146. Id at 848.
147. According to Judge Leventhal, "a unique three-way partnership between the legislature,
executive and judiciary, was contemplated by the Congress" and was apparent in the provisions of
statutes like the Clean Air Act. InternationalHarvester, 478 F2d at 635.
148.

EDFv EPA, 465 F2d at 540-41 (DC Cir 1972). See also Appalachian Power Co. v EPA, 477 F2d

495, 505 n37 (4th Cir 1973).
149. PortlandCement Ass'n, 486 F2d at 394. Among other things, this supervision would hold EPA
to "a high standard of articulation" to ensure that EPA had complied with its obligation to take a
"hard look" at the problems involved in its regulatory task. See id; EDF v EPA, 465 F2d at 541:
Kennecott Copper Corp., 462 F2d 846.
150. EDF v Ruckelshaus, 439 F2d at 597. To some, it seemed likely that the nature of the
partnership would change over time:
I think we are still in an evolutionary period. It may very well be that what we have is a
period of the courts instructing the agencies on how they are to act and how they are to
carry out their new environmental responsibilities. We may later come to a retrenchment
where the courts pull back, satisfied that the agencies are carrying out their mandates....
The better the agencies get, the less the courts will have to do.
Panel, 7 Nat Res L at 370-71 (cited in note 97) (remarks of Grant Thompson). David Sive concluded
that judicial review "in depth" was likely to be commonplace at the beginning of the new
environmental era because few of the issues to reach the courts would involve the propriety of
administrative conclusions concerning undisputed facts arising under a statute whose meaning
created little dispute.

David Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawver in the Wilderness of

Administrative Law, 70 Colum L Rev 612, 621 (1970). He expected this situation to continue "for a
considerable period." Id.
151. Both agency capture and the view that environmental values are special contributed to the
atrophy of judicial deference to agency expertise and the development of the hard look, but of the
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technical expertise, 15 2 the courts apparently took the Overton Park mandate
concerning the scope of review of factual matters seriously; the tendency, at
least in courts like the District of Columbia Circuit, was toward "thorough,
probing, in-depth

review"' 1 53 of EPA's

scientific determinations.

54

In

response to criticisms that they were overstepping the bounds of both their
competence and authority, the judges conducting this kind of review stated
that it was not a departure from a court's proper function to peruse carefully
the agency record, even as to technical and specialized matters. Indeed,
Judge Skelly Wright argued, "[t]he more technical the case, the more
intensive must be the court's effort to understand the evidence, for without an
appropriate understanding of the case before it the court cannot properly
perform its appellate function."'' 55 This function was to satisfy itself that the

two, the special character of environmental values may have been the more influential. See Rabin, 38
Stan L Rev at 1299 (cited in note 3):
The erosion of faith in administrative expertise did not in itself trigger the rise of judicial
activism in the early 1970s. Rather, it was the multifaceted concern about environmental
issues-fueled, in particular, by the enactment of major new environmental legislation like
NEPA and the Clean Air Act-that provided the building blocks for the new foundations of
judicial review of administrative action.
152. See, for example, South Terminal Corp., 504 F2d at 665 (As laymen, judges are in no position
to know how much weight to give to industry's arguments that EPA's measurements of required
reductions in air pollutants are without foundation, since the arguments are based on technical
assumptions.); International Harvester, 478 F2d at 647 (Courts undertake with diffidence the task of
probing into complex technical matters.); id at 651 (Judge Bazelon recognized that he did "not know
enough about dynamometer extrapolations, deterioration factor adjustments, and the like to decide
whether or not the government's approach to these matters was statistically valid."). Not all of the
judges agreed, however, on the implications of the agency's superior expertise. Judge Bazelon
emphasized the dangers of rigorous judicial review of scientific and technical matters. De novo
evaluation of such matters "inevitably invites judges of opposing views to make plausible-sounding,
but simplistic, judgments of the relative weight to be afforded various pieces of technical data." Ethyl
Corp., 541 F2d at 66 (Bazelon, concurring). Because he felt that "substantive review of mathematical
and scientific evidence by technically illiterate judges is dangerously unreliable," he recommended
foregoing such review in favor of attempts to strengthen administrative procedures to improve the
quality of agency decisions. Id at 67; see also, Judge Bazelon's opinion in InternationalHarvester, 478
F2d at 651-52. Judge Oakes, on the other hand, rejected the notion that judges were incapable of
mastering scientific concepts and terminology. Although they could not be expected to understand a
specific problem as well as an EPA scientist, "such depth of understanding is not necessary to decide
the lesser question whether an agency has acted arbitrarily or capriciously." Oakes, 7 Envir L Rptr at
50031 (cited in note 75). See also EDF v EPA, 465 F2d at 541. Other judges stressed the courts'
duty to ensure that the agency has demonstrated careful consideration of even complex technical
matters. "A court would abdicate its function were it, when confronted with important and
seemingly plausible objections going to the heart of a key technical determination, to presume that
the agency could never behave irrationally." South Terminal Corp., 504 F2d at 665. See also Portland
Cement Ass'n, 486 F2d at 402 (reviewing courts have a duty to consider whether agency decisions
concerning technical matters reflect a clear error in judgment); InternationalHarvester,478 F2d at 647
(Review of complex technical matters "is an inescapable aspect of the judicial condition.").
153. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 US at 415 (1971).
154. Judge Leventhal of the D.C. Circuit contended in 1974 that, despite the argument that the
technical complexity of the issues in environmental cases should restrict the scope of judicial review,
"a fair assessment of judicial developments must put it that in the environmental field the courts so
far have been, if anything, fully vigilant to exercise rather than abdicate their supervisory role."
Leventhal, 122 U Pa L Rev at 512 (cited in note 76).
155. Ethyl Corp., 541 F2d at 36.
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agency has exercised its discretion reasonably, "with reasons that do not
56
deviate from or ignore the ascertainable legislative intent."'
Review of EPA's statutory interpretations and policy determinations was
no less rigorous. In the Aldrin/Dieldrin case, the court devised a "corollary" to
the principle that Congress could vest policy choices in EPA: the agency's
decisions "must be explained, not merely explainable, in terms of the
ingredients announced by [EPA] as comprising the Agency's policies and
standards."' 15 7 The court then rejected the agency's recitation of pesticide
benefits as an adequate reason for refusing to suspend registration because
EPA had failed to consider whether proposed alternatives were available or
58
feasible. 1

The tendency to skew judicial review toward a more intensive focus on
decisions appearing to ignore or downplay environmental concerns was not
universal. For example, judicial review of EPA's early implementation of
statutes like the Clean Water Act produced a series of decisions in which the
Fourth and Eighth Circuits reversed EPA's issuance of technology-based
standards because they reflected insufficient consideration of the cost of
compliance or had improperly assessed industry's capacity to develop or
apply necessary controls. 159 By the mid-1970s, in cases arising under the
Clean Air Act, the courts had also reversed EPA decisions involving a balance
of health, technological, and economic factors for giving insufficient
consideration to the last two categories. 60 However, even when they
chastised the agency for not properly considering countervailing factors such
as cost, the courts employed the characteristic "hard look" profile endorsed in
Overton Park. In InternationalHarvester, for example, the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed EPA's denial of the automobile manufacturers' application
for a suspension of emission standards for light-duty vehicles. 161 Because, in
the court's view, the risks (primarily economic) of an erroneous denial of
suspension outweighed the risks (primarily environmental) of an erroneous
grant, the court remanded to EPA for reconsideration. 16 2 In another case, the
same court, sitting en banc, reversed an earlier panel decision invalidating EPA
regulations that limited lead content in gasoline. Judge Bazelon's
156. InternationalHarvester, 478 F2d at 648, citing Greater Boston Television Corp., 444 F2d at 850.
See also South Terminal Corp., 504 F2d at 655 (though EPA's technical decisions are difficult for
nonexpert judges to evaluate, the court must assure itself as best it can that EPA's technical
conclusions are as rational as others' conclusions); PortlandCement Ass'n, 486 F2d at 386.
157. EDF v EPA, 465 F2d at 539.
158. Id.
159. See generally George Cameron Coggins & Thomas 0. McGarity, Judicial Review of
Technological Standards under the Clean Water Act (American Institute of Chemical Engineers Symposium
Series, 1979); Thomas 0. McGarity, Media Quality, Technology and Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for
Health and Environmental Regulation, 46 L & Contemp Probs 159, 212-17 (Summer 1983).
160. See D. Bruce La Pierre, Technology-Forcingand Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 Iowa
L Rev 771, 790, 820, 828 (1977), and cases cited therein.
161. International Harvester, 478 F2d 615.
162. Id at 636, 641, 648-50. The court's independent risk balancing was intended to inform the
court of what Congress would have intended if it could have foreseen the precise situation
confronting EPA and the court. Id at 648.
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concurrence warned against the temptation, reflected, he said, in both the
panel decision and its reversal, to engage in "legislative policy determinations
alien to [a court's] true function."' 63 Even if such cases did not reflect the
view that environmental values were special, they tended to proceed from the
premise that the statutes EPA was charged with administering encompassed
coherent public policy, and that judicial review was necessary to prevent the
agency from deviating from such policy.
In sum, the courts' expressed willingness in the 1970s to intervene more
frequently in EPA action reflected all three components of the political vision
we have summarized. First, capture theory had undermined general
arguments that agencies are entitled to deference. Second, under optimistic
pluralism Congress was viewed as a body that could, at least some of the time,
produce coherent public policy. Third, the special status of environmental
values induced judges to interpret most environmental legislation as being
instances where just such a thing had occurred-Congress had enacted
statutes with animating purposes that the courts could then deploy as bases to
superintend agency workproduct.
C.

Lately: Pessimistic Pluralism, the Ordinary Value of Environmental
Protection, and Executive Competence

1. Pessimistic Pluralism.164 The major story in American political theory in
the 1970s was the disintegration of optimistic pluralism, precipitated by
critiques that exposed two weaknesses in pluralist theory. The first weakness
was a fundamental incompatibility between agency capture theory and the
idea that competition in the political arena would produce fair and sound
social policy, whether the mechanism for doing so was some rather ill-defined
tendency toward equilibrium or, as the Legal Process scholars posited, the
sage work of the reasonable legislator.
The theory of agency capture assumes that human behavior is importantly
influenced by self-interest. The logic of collective action takes that premise
and applies it to group behaviors. Capture theorists applied the same premise
to agency officials and bureaucrats themselves, and predicted that their
actions would reflect self-interested motivations, such as currying favor with
lobbies that can help them in expanding the bureau's budget or in supporting
them before Congress, making agency jobs less stressful by adopting
cooperative rather than adversarial behaviors, and maintaining good relations
with potential future employers. In combination, these three behaviors
65
produce systematically redistributive regulation.'
163. Ethyl Corp., 541 F2d at 67 (Bazelon concurring). Judge Bazelon, however, concurred in the
court's reversal of EPA's suspension decision in International Harvester. See 478 F2d at 650-53
(Bazelon concurring).
164. One of the authors had coined this term in an earlier manuscript. Having read Eskridge &
Frickey, 48 U Pitt L Rev at 707 (cited in note 60), we must now credit them, We do not know
whether it is original to any of us.
165. See text accompanying notes 175-76.
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In contrast, optimistic pluralism posits that legislators will either rationally
develop sound social policy or operate as honest brokers in a competitive
political marketplace, but it fails to explain from a self-interested perspective
why politicians should behave that way. In fact, it seems to exempt politicians
from the assumption of self-interested motivation entirely. The conflict
between the motivational assumptions of capture theory and optimistic
pluralism have been exposed by the recently emergent theory of public
choice, which insists that the same assumption of self interest applicable to
citizens acting singly, citizens acting in interest groups, and citizens acting in
bureaucracies also be maintained with respect to elected officials. According
to public choice, "politicians are like the rest of us; their personal, private
16 6
interests are their fundamental concerns."'
Once politicians are taken to be as self-interested as bureaucrats, many of
the pessimistic conclusions of capture theory ought to apply, ceteris paribus, to
the behavior of Congress. 6 7 Concentrated interest groups will enjoy
systematic advantages in maintaining or improving their positions relative to
more dispersed, less concentrated, interests. Concentrated groups will "rentseek," 6 8 attempting to use the legislative process to lock in economic
advantages, so long as the costs of organizing and lobbying to do so are less
than the expected benefits of the favorable legislation.' 69
The fact that group interests do not all enjoy equal competitive advantages
in the agency world led to the prediction that agencies would be captured by
cohesive interest groups. Once captured, the legitimacy of an agency's work
product becomes seriously suspect: when a mere subset of affected private
interests dominates the bureau's decisionmaking processes, there is no
particular reason to confer respect on the decisions thus reached, or to defer
to those decisions. The judicial activism of the hard look era constitutes the
judiciary's response to this diagnosis. Likewise, if the same dynamics are at
166. Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 Va L Rev 339, 362 (1988). See also
Edward Foster, The Balanced Budget Amendment and Economic Thought, 2 Const Comm 353, 366 (1985)
("The theory of public choice rests on the assumption of self-interested behavior by all of the actors
in the political process.").
167. A growing body of scholarship traces the consequences of the logic of collective actio: and
the assumption of self-interested motivation in the legislative context. See, for example, Robert D.
Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 Va L Rev 339 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Politics without
Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 Va L Rev 275 (1988).
168. The term "rent-seek"
refers to the attempt to obtain economic rents (i.e., payments for the use of an economic
asset in excess of the market price) through government intervention in the market. A
classic example of rent-seeking is a corporation's attempt to obtain monopolies granted by
government. Such monopolies allow firms to raise prices above competitive levels. The
increased income is economic rent from government regulation.
Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest
Group Model, 86 Colum L Rev 223, 224 n6 (1986).
169. For example, James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison & Gordon Tullock, eds, Toward a
Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society (Texas A&M U Press, 1980); Gordon Tullock, The Transitional Gains
Trap, 6 BellJ Econ & Mgmt Sci 671 (1975); GeorgeJ. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BellJ
Econ & Mgmt Sci 3 (1971); Sam Peltzman, Toward a Afore General Theory of Regulation, 19 J L & Econ
211 (1976). An excellent overview of the public choice literature on legislation is Eskridge, 74 Va L
Rev at 275-95 (cited in note 167).
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work at the congressional level, the reasons to respect or defer to legislative
decisions diminish. 170 In particular, the easy complacency of optimistic
pluralism that the equilibria reached through the pluralistic legislative process
is in some sense "fair" or "sound" can no longer be sustained.' 7 ' To the
contrary, the results from legislation are "pretty grim."' 72 Public goods that
the legislature ought to be supplying will not be provided, because demand
for them is diffuse and disorganized, while special interest group legislation
inevitably will be passed. 173 We will examine the judicial responses to this
174
diagnosis in a moment.
A major project of public choice theory has been to demonstrate that the
actions of government, including the Congress, are generally consistent with
the predictions based on the assumption of self-interested motivations. The
emerging result is a "redistributive" theory of government, albeit a
redistribution with thoroughly negative connotations:
[tihis [redistributive] theory purports to explain many of the activities of modern
government as having nothing to do with the public interest-except perhaps at the
level of justification and propaganda-but rather to be motivated by attempts to
redistribute wealth away from one group and toward another.
The favored group
75
need not be, and very often plainly is not, in any sense poor.'

The public choice critique of congressional behavior undermines pluralism
both procedurally and substantively. Procedurally, the logic of collective
action gives systematic advantages to particular privately-motivated actors,
thereby generating no a priori confidence in the outcomes of congressional
decisions; substantively, studies of particular legislative regimes seem to
substantiate the charge that those regimes do, in fact, redistribute wealth
toward special interest groups that have no legitimate claim to those
resources.'

76

The clash between pessimistic and optimistic pluralism as described to this
point is a conflict between theories of behavior. Optimistic pluralism had
170. The "payments" to elected politicians that motivate their self-interested actions "take the
form of campaign contributions, votes, implicit promises of future favors, and sometimes outright
bribes." William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The IndependentJudiciary in Interest Group Perspective,
18J L & Econ 875, 877 (1975). Compare the types of "payments" bureaucrats are said to receive.
See text accompanying notes 101-03.
171.
For example, Miller, 77 Am Pol Sci Rev at 735 (cited in note 60) ("That all groups in society
are equally likely to be organized and effective in interest group politics is a proposition that has been
decisively refuted by both theoretical argument .. .and empirical evidence .... [Tihus equilibrium
among organized groups' demands-even if such exists and determines political outcomes-merits
no particular approbation as fair public policy.").
172. Eskridge, 74 Va L Rev at 294 (cited in note 167).
173. Id.
174. See text accompanying notes 203-66.
175. William Bishop, A Theory of Administrative Law, 19J Legal Stud 489, 498 (1990).
176. See for example, Richard B. Stewart, Regulation in the Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity
Values, 92 Yale LJ 1537, 1540-41 (1983) ("Consider .. .a regulatory system that limits entry to the
interstate trucking industry, raises prices to consumers, and gives truckers monopoly profits. On
what basis are truckers to be preferred to consumers? If the truckers' advantage reflects nothing but
their success in manipulating governmental power to their own purposes .. .this transfer [of wealth
from consumers to truckers] violates [liberal] neutrality."). For elaboration of this charge in the
particular context of environmental legislation, see text accompanying notes 201-02.
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erected a distinction between elected officials and the rest of us with respect
to what motivates their actions. When faced with the challenge of justifying
the distinction, however, optimistic pluralism found itself singularly illequipped to do so. This was its second weakness.
To respond to public choice theory's challenge, optimistic pluralism
needed a coherent alternative theory of what motivated public officials in their
official capacities, one that could recommend itself as a way to legitimate
actions resulting from those motivations. Historically, republican theories
had supplied such an alternative. Republicanism asserts both the necessity of,
and the possibility of, citizens possessing and being motivated by public
virtues. These virtues prompt citizens to place their decisions within a
framework larger than self-interest, a framework that asks what is best for the
country. 17 7 Such a theory might have provided the starting point for a reply.
When optimistic pluralism looked around for that theory, however, it
78
found itself in much the same position that had worried Sir Thomas More.'
Pluralism, developed in a period when ideology had purportedly ended, had
implicitly treated all interests that citizens might actually have as equally
legitimate and entitled to respect.1 79 The sources of or motivations for
pluralistic disagreement were largely exogenous to pluralism's analysis, which
concentrated on understanding how a system of dispersed powers and
interests mediated those disagreements, without casting any judgments on the
merits of them.' 8 0 Republican ideas, which postulate the existence of an
objective public interest, had been submerged, whether through conscious
rejection, benign neglect, or some combination of the two. As a consequence,
when the pessimists challenged the implicit assumption that politicians
behave in the public interest, pluralism lacked even a coherent explanation of
what such behavior might look like, let alone a convincing argument that
177. See, for example, Sunstein, 97 Yale LJ at 1539-52 (cited in note 4); Michelman, 100 Harv L
Rev 4 (cited in note 61).
178. The law, Roper, the law. I know what's legal, not what's right. And I'll stick to what's
legal.... The currents and eddies of right and wrong, which you find such plain-sailing, I
can't navigate, I'm no voyager. But in the thickets of the law, oh there I'm a forester....
What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil? ... And when
the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you-where would you hide, Roper,
the laws all being flat? This country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast-Man's
laws, not God's-and if you cut them down... d'you really think you could stand upright in
the winds that would blow then?
Robert Bolt, A Man for All Seasons, Act I, at 65-66 (Random House, 1960).
179. On the end of ideology, see generally, Chaim I. Waxman, ed, The End of Ideology Debate (Funk
& Wagnalls, 1968).
180. See, for example, Lowi, The End of Liberalism at 76 (cited in note 60):
Interest-group liberalism [in which pluralist theory plays a major role] helps solve . . . the
problem of enhanced conflict and how to resolve it. The politician's contribution to society
is his skill in resolving conflict. However, direct confrontations [are typically avoided]. The
typical American politician displaces and defers and delegates conflict where possible; he
squarely faces conflict only when he must. . . . [Interest-group liberalism] provides a
theoretical basis for giving to each according to his claim, the price for which is a reduction
of concern for what others are claiming. In other words, it transforms logrolling from
necessary evil to greater good.
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politicians would in fact pursue such behavior, because it lacked a theory of
public virtue or public values.
Pluralism had constructed a theory in which citizens were perceived as
legitimately pursuing through interest groups whatever values they chose. In
the course of doing so, it had failed to develop, or to keep current, any
explanation for why people make choices other than in their self-interest.
When public choice theorists pointed out the obvious-that self-interest
certainly is one significant reason people make choices, and politicians are
people-pluralism was essentially mute in response. It lacked a theory of
public values that could serve as a break against the devil's wind of selfinterest.
Unable to mount a defense against public choice, pluralists tacitly
conceded not only that individuals were self-interested, but that every motive
was, at bottom, self-interested. The behavioral or motivational thesis of public
choice became wedded to a subjective theory of values. By the late 1970s, this
marriage was beginning to receive wide recognition within political theory
and scholarship.

81

Not only were "politicians just like the rest of us'

82

-

vulnerable to self-interested motivations-but there was "no ascertainable,
transcendent 'public interest,' but only the distinct interest of various
individuals and groups in society." 1 8 3 In short, while early capture theory
warned that agencies should be viewed as "subsidizing private interests at the
expense of public good,"' 8 4 pessimistic pluralism warned additionally that
there is not even such a thing as a public good or public interest, only
competing private interests.' 8 5 Somewhat ironically, we have come to call
these interests "special" interests, intending thereby to convey that they are
181. See for example, Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination:
CompetingJudicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 Ind LJ 145, 148-57 (1977-78).
182. Tollison, 74 Va L Rev at 362 (cited in note 167).
183. Stewart, 88 Harv L Rev at 1712 (cited in note 3).
184. Wiley, 99 Harv L Rev at 723 (cited in note 99).
185. See, Stewart, 88 Harv L Rev at 1712 (cited in note 3), claiming that by 1975 the courts were
already pursuing a policy of assuring "fair representation for all affected interests in the exercise of
the legislative power delegated to agencies," and that "[i]mplicit in this development is that there is
no ascertainable, transcendent 'public interest,' but only the distinct interests of various individuals
and groups in society." Professor Stewart also argues that " 'public interest' lawyers actually
represent important but unorganized private interests rather than some transcendent collective
interest in the national welfare." Id at 1683 n67. Although he may have been making an empirical
observation here, the context suggests he is denying the very possibility of a "public interest."
More recently, while he was assistant attorney general for the Environment and Natural
Resources, Professor Stewart wrote more cautiously concerning whether there may be a public
interest distinct from the private interests of subgroups of the population. Characterizing the
administrative changes he chronicled in the Reformation article as "attempt[ing] to cure Madison's
Nightmare" by creating a forum in which all interests could participate, he said that the hope of such
changes was "that decisions in furtherance of the public interest would emerge out of the judiciallysupervised clash of factions." Richard B. Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U Chi L Rev 335, 345
(1990). Could it be that Professor Stewart's post as a public servant motivated him to be a little more
circumspect in asserting that there is no such thing as a public interest? Maybe, but he had expressed
similar sentiments earlier. See Stewart, 92 Yale LJ at 1540 n12 (cited in note 176) (explaining a
version of liberalism "premised on a pluralistic conception of the good [that] rejects the view that
moral values are wholly subjective and cannot form a rational basis for collective action").
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not so special, but merely an assemblage of privately motivated parties
working in concert.
As they have penetrated deeply into legal scholarship, these pessimistic
pluralist ideas have undermined the Legal Process assumption of a reasonable
legislator and replaced it with an image of legislator as dealmaker.
"Contemporary legal scholarship is haunted by the idea that statutes are
86
nothing more than deals between contending interest groups."'
2. The Environment as an Ordinary Value. What public choice or economic
theory means by self-interest needs to be carefully understood. No values
germane to a discussion of environmental policy are ruled out by the
assumption that individuals behave self-interestedly. Love of family, love of
country, altruism, and love of the environment are all permissible motivations
or values for self-interested individuals. These values are self-interested as
long as the agent perceives that vindicating (or thwarting) them has an effect
on the agent's well-being, and acts on them for that reason.18 7 The essential
part of the definition of self-interest is that it is self-reflexive: it is the utility or
well-being of the individual as perceived by the individual that defines selfinterested behavior.
Once interests or values are grounded in utility, those interests or values
are eligible for the kind of egalitarian treatment for which utilitarianism is
famous: each one counts for one. Because 'values are defined with respect to
the self-reflexive utility of the individual, no one is justified in claiming that
any value is special or unusually entitled to respect or, in republican terms,
"public," except by relating that value to individual utilities. In order to have
the only kind of value that this theoretical frame recognizes, "values" that an
individual asserts must be cashed out in terms of his or her individual utility.
Different values may have different rates of utility production for different
individuals, or for the same individual at different times. However, even an
extremely high rate of utility production for a very large percentage of the
population does not make the value more special than any other value.
The normative voice of public choice argues that the utilities of all
individuals are entitled to equal consideration as long as the individuals
186. Daniel A. Farbe & Philip P. Frickey, TheJurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65 Tex L Rev 873, 925
(1987). See also Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 446-51 (cited in note 3) (summarizing the public choice
arguments that statutes are private deals and that talk of public purposes is incoherent).
187. See, for example, Ryan C. Amacher, Robert D. Tollison & Thomas D. Willett, The Economic
Approach to Social Policy Questions: Some Methodological Perspectives, in Ryan C. Amacher, Robert D.
Tollison & Thomas D. Willett, eds, The Economic Approach to Public Policy 18, 25 (Cornell U Press,
1976):
Economists take maximizing behavior as a guideline, but they do not limit their
consideration of maximizing behavior to economic variables alone; they also tend to look at
broader trade-offs among political and other variables. The economist does not view the
concept of self-interest narrowly. Individual choice is simply characterized as utilitymaximizing behavior. Many human motivations, including those of love, altruism, and
power, result in behavior that can be regarded as utility-maximizing.
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themselves are so entitled.' 8 While liberal thought in general and pluralism
in particular have never acceded to the idea of complete equality of value,' 8 9
that idea has been deployed to conclude that a wide variety of values,
including environmental values, are of equivalent status.
One way to treat environmental values as ordinary is to assimilate them to
the economic perspective on social policy decisionmaking. While the
economic marketplace does not enable direct trades in individual utilities, it
does recognize a single, consistent measure of individual preferences, namely
willingness to pay (and, in the case of sellers, willingness to be paid). In our
society, many goods and services that people value are traded in the market.
Urging that attributes of the environment that people value be traded in the
market, or allocated according to market substitutes such as cost benefit
analysis, is grounded on the idea that those environmental qualities are
ordinary in the same sense as a case of tomatoes or a new car is ordinary.
In this vein, policy analysts argue that "environmental problems are
economic problems, and better insight can be gained by the application of
economic analysis."' 190 Such insight is important, it is claimed, because "we
are going to make very little progress in solving the problem of pollution until
we recognize it for what, primarily, it is: an economic problem, which must be
understood in economic terms." 19 l
In the 1970s, and more so in the 1980s, more and more arguments over
environmental policy advanced an economic understanding of environmental
values. Non-economic bases for environmental values were seen as
postulating "a set of values [held] to be transcendent and absolute, inherent
in the nature of man and therefore ineluctable"1 92 -a version of the
worldview that pessimistic pluralists reject. On the other hand, "the
economist's model ... seems ... more in keeping with democratic theory in a

188. Theories of subjectively determined values need not hold that individuals are always the best
judges of the best means for advancing individual well-being. Individuals might be mistaken in
making means-ends connections, so that certain forms of paternalistic behavior on the part, say, of
the state might be permissible to override what the individual would otherwise choose to do.
Paternalism, however, is fraught with all the problems of knowing others' minds, so that the
presumption of such theories is undoubtedly in the direction of consumer or actor sovereignty.
Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics
65-74, 100-09 (Yale U Press, 1989).
189. See, for example, Steve Shiffrin, who argues liberal societies necessarily do not accord equal
status to certain values that the society concludes are destructive or anti-social, such as the value a
rapist sees in being able to sexually assault a victim, or the value a thief sees in being able to steal.
Steve Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L Rev 1103, 1147-70 (1983).
Ronald Dworkin has advanced an argument for protecting individual rights, regardless of whether
doing so diminishes overall utility, in part as a means to screen out "other-regarding" preferences,
such as the !,r, ference of a white racist in seeing blacks subjugated, that otherwise might have an
unsavory ef ,! )n a strict utility-maximizing system of social order. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously
234-38, 275-7,> (cited in note 45).
190. William F. Baxter, People or Penguins: The Casefor Optimum Pollution 17 (Colum U Press, 1974).
191. Larry E. Ruff, The Economic Common Sense of Pollution, in Robert Dorfman & Nancy S. Dorfman,
eds, Economics of the Environment 41, 41 (W.W. Norton, 2d ed 1977).
192. CharlesJ. Meyers, An Introduction to Environmental Thought: Some Sources and Some Criticisms, 50
Ind LJ 426, 452 (1975).

Page 249: Autumn 1991]E

EPA

AND THE COURTS

pluralistic society,"' 93 in which no values are absolute and preferences are
pursued in the pluralistic ambience of competition and compromise.
Assimilating environmental values to the economic perspective, hence
rendering them ordinary, was behind the much-heralded, but almost
completely failed, effort of the early Reagan Administration to privatize public
lands. Once a piece of property is placed in private ownership, it becomes
available for use and disposition according to the utility-driven preferences of
the owner and other potential claimants. If environmental preservation is
sufficiently preferred, and a market exists for the effective expression of that
preference, the land will be preserved. If, on the other hand, oil exploration
is more highly preferred, and markets permit, the land will be put to that use.
Environmental protection and environmental values compete on a
qualitatively level playing field with all other competing values.
This levelling of values was dramatically illustrated during the Bork
hearings, although for an entirely different purpose. In defending his
position that Griswold v. Connecticut was an unprincipled decision, Judge Bork
compared the competing values involved in the case-the value to the couple
to have sexual relations without fear of an unwanted pregnancy versus the
value to the majority of a certain moral theory-with another situation in
which the competing values would seem self-evidently equivalent. "Compare
the facts in Griswold," he argued, "with a hypothetical suit by an electric utility
company and one of its customers to void a smoke pollution ordinance as
94
unconstitutional. The cases are identical."'
The electrical company asserts that it wishes to produce electricity at low cost in order
to reach a wide market and make profits .... The smoke pollution regulation impairs
[the company's] economic gratifications. The State can assert not only that the

majority prefer clean air to lower prices, but also that the absence of the regulation
impairs the majority's physical and aesthetic gratifications. . . . Unless we can
distinguish forms of gratifications, the only course for a principled Court is to let the
majority have its way in both cases. It is clear that the Court cannot make the
necessary distinction .... Equality of human gratifications, where the [Constitution]
1 95
does not impose a hierarchy, is an essential part of constitutional doctrine.

Bork's specific point was to warn the courts away from intervening in majority
decisionmaking, but the grounds for doing so reflect the way in which a
subjective theory of values, coupled with a liberal assumption of individual
equality, produces a levelling of environmental values. Within this
framework, desiring to profit from air pollution and desiring to profit from
clean air are but equal human gratifications because each is the manifestation
of the subjectively determined values of individuals who are entitled to equal
status. Majoritarian decisionmaking controls in such cases more or less by
default, since the only way to decide what to do is to do what the greater
number desire.
193.
194.

Id at 452-53.
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind LJ 1,9 (1971),

discussed in Bork Hearings at Part 1, 114-15 (cited in note 42).
195. Bork, 47 Ind LJ at 10 (cited in note 194).
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Employing the economic model to resolve environmental conflicts is, of
course, extremely difficult. Unless satisfactory markets can be created, market
surrogates like cost-benefit analysis become the usual instrument of choice,
yet developing credible analytic techniques for complex environmental
decisions continues to be shrouded in controversy. 96 Nevertheless, the
widely shared belief that cost-benefit analysis is, in principle, the correct
approach to resolving environmental controversies confirms the movement
toward treating environmental values as ordinary.
Studies of the legislative process have similarly promoted the view of
environmental values as ordinary. These studies have documented several
characteristics of environmental legislation that should have been obvious in
any event. First, almost all environmental legislation bestows discrete benefits
on some groups in society and discrete detriments on others. For example,
nationally uniform emissions standards for new air polluting sources benefit
Rust Belt states at the expense of Sun Belt states. If polluters were regulated
exclusively according to ambient air quality conditions, the Sun Belt states
would be able to attract new industry by offering them lower cost locations
than Rust Belt states, who would be forced to impose much stricter emissions
standards to reflect the fact that their air is already much dirtier.
Environmental statutes provide ample additional examples of provisions that
19 7
have markedly disparate impacts throughout the country.
Second, environmental statutes bestow differential class benefits, as well.
It appears that much environmental protection favors middle class and upper
middle class groups at the expense of lower class groups. 9 8 The middle class
prefers environmental amenities to job growth, for instance, because they feel
fairly secure in their job positions and have largely satisfied basic necessities
and other preferences. They are ready to expand their search for value to
relative luxuries such as wilderness hiking. The poor, on the other hand,
differentially prefer jobs to stringent environmental controls. Since they live
in already well-polluted urban areas, they prefer economic growth to
stagnation. (Perhaps they also intuitively subscribe to Aaron Wildavsky's view
that "richer is healthier.")
These studies reinforce the characterization of environmental values as
ordinary. To the extent distinct "special interests" benefit from
environmental legislation, it becomes attractive to incorporate such
legislation into the special interest, "redistributive" theory of government 9 9
where private, self-interested groups organize to extract private gains from
government.
196. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationalefor TechnologyBased Regulation, 1991 Duke L Rev 729.
197. See, for example, Bruce A. Ackerman & William Hassler, Dirty Air and Clean Coal (Yale U
Press, 1981), describing Senator Byrd's successful efforts to require universal scrubbing of coal, thus
severely diminishing the economic advantages that cleaner Western coal would have had over dirtier
coal from Eastern states, including Senator Byrd's West Virginia.
198. For example, see Stewart & Krier, Environmental Law & Policy 71-73 (cited in note 107).
199. See text accompanying note 175.
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Analyses of congressional voting behavior further reinforce this
characterization, because they reveal senators and congresspeople behaving
with respect to environmental legislation in just the self-interested manner
that the pessimistic pluralist theory predicts. For example, when differential
geographical benefits are at stake, congressional voting patterns fall out along
remarkably congruent geographical lines, suggesting that congresspeople are
aware of the legislation's geographic implications, and that they vote
20 0
consistently, with the theory of pessimistic pluralism.
Self-interested political behavior can be documented at the micro-level,
the level Congress refers to as the "pork-barrel." The Senate version of the
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments provides a timely case study. As it emerged,
it bore the marks of "a special interest feeding frenzy," in the words of
National Resources Defense Council attorney Richard Ayres. 20 1 The list of
specially crafted loopholes in the environmental protection measure goes on
and on:
West Virginia and Ohio will get billions of dollars to build "clean coal" plants. Steel
mills in a few states will have 30 years to control poisonous emissions, instead of the
10 years given other industrial polluters. Florida power companies will get a $400million, 10-year break on pollution control costs.
Sen. Lloyd Bentsen, a Texas Democrat, arranged for a national center to study toxic
pollution to be created in Houston. Colorado Sens. Timothy Wirth, a Democrat, and
William Armstrong, a Republican, got money to establish centers in Colorado for the
study of high-altitude pollution from autos and trucks. And Sen. Alan Simpson, a
Wyoming Republican, arranged for a $ 750,000 acid rain research project to be
steered to the University of Wyoming.
Sen. Bob Dole of Kansas sponsored an amendment that requires oil companies to buy
grain to produce ethanol, a less polluting fuel. Although the oil companies and the
Bush Administration opposed the measure and viewed it as a giveaway to a few big
agriculture conglomerates, the opposition withered in the face of Dole's influence.
Dole also backed the amendments exempting most toxic chemicals used by farmers.
In the language of Congress, several senators were given "fixes" for their status....
The case of Senator Quentin Burdick, a North Dakota Democrat who is chairman of
the Environment Committee, shows how one senator's influence can shape a major
piece of legislation. Burdick exempted his state's worst polluting power plants from
the bill ....
His state would be the only one in the lower forty-eight to be exempted
from key parts of the acid rain central laws, saving hundreds of millions of dollars for
the owners of the five worst-polluting plants....
Through the allocation of extra "pollution control credits," [Burdick's amendment
would effectively exempt] power plants fired by lignite coal from the acid rain law in
states in which every county is in compliance with current clean air laws. Only North
Dakota fits that description. With a few senators on the floor, the amendment was
discussed for a few minutes. No one objected and the provision was approved without
a roll-call vote.
Burdick declined to be interviewed. His spokesman, Joan Brodshaug, said that North
Dakota deserved the exemption because it meets all clean air laws and because the
state would have been economically harmed if the five plants representing one-fourth
of the state's power had been required to comply with the clean air laws.

200. B. Peter Pashigan, Environmental Protection: Whose Interests are Being Protected?, 23 Economic
Inquiry 551 (1985).
201. Michael Kranish, Politics and Pollution, Boston Globe 1 (April 9, 1990).

286

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY

PROBLEMS

[Vol. 54: No. 4

"The goal of this bill is to improve the health of Americans," she said. "North Dakota
doesn't need to because all of our counties are in compliance with clean air laws."
Environmentalists said, however, that North Dakota's clean air compliance has
nothing to do with the issue because pollutants from power plants are often senk outof-state by the wind. "To have a special exemption for one state is completely
unwarranted," environmental lobbyist Ayres said. "I assume he got it because he is
chairman of the committee."202
It would appear that the senators saw little distinction between the Clean Air
Act and a fight over which defense installations to close, or an appropriation
for public works projects. The pork tastes as good, from whichever barrel it
comes. Each constitutes an opportunity to benefit the groups or interests that
can in turn benefit the politician.
3. Executive Competence. The political landscape just sketched differs in two
crucial respects from the topographical map in place at EPA's creation. First,
pessimistic pluralism depicts Congress as a prominent source of society's
troubles, instead of a reasonable composer of pluralist differences with the
capacity to articulate and enact coherent public policy. Second, casting
environmental protection as an ordinary value, in no sense special to society,
facilitates
assimilating environmental
legislation
into the
general
redistributive theory of government. Environmental legislation cannot be
considered a counter-example to the pessimist's picture.
We have argued that a conception of the legislative process and its output
is essential to a theory ofjudicial review. 20 3 These two changes in the political
environment would be enough to prompt a reconsideration of the
appropriate role of judicial review, as well as of the costs and benefits of such
review. Yet another change has been occurring, however: at the same time
that Congress's policymaking capabilities have been disparaged, the belief
that the executive is competent to develop sound public policy has been
enjoying something of a renaissance. The cumulative effects of these three
developments has been a general trend toward a more restrained approach to
review of EPA decisions. 20 4 This trend can be traced in the Supreme Court's
important Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC decision.
Chevron upheld a decision by EPA to interpret the term "source," as
applied to the nonattainment provisions of the Clean Air Act, to permit the
use of the bubble concept. 20 5 That EPA decision, made during President
Reagan's first term, reversed the position taken on the question by the
preceding Carter Administration. The new interpretation was consistent with
the clear early interest of the Reagan Administration to minimize
202. Id.
203. See text accompanying notes 70-73, 167-73.
204. One can, of course, find exceptions to the general rule. See for example. NTRDC v EPA, 907
F2d 1146 (DC Cir 1990) (reflecting comprehensive analysis of legislative history to determine
whether EPA's statutory interpretation was correct); EDF v EPA, 898 F2d 183 (DC Cir 1990)
(remanding to EPA Clean Air Act regulations for failing to consider adequately statutory factors).
205. 467 US 837 (1984). Under the bubble concept, a polluter may increase pollution at one
point in a plant without triggering expensive pollution control requirements if reductions elsewhere
at the plant offset the increase. Id at 855-57.

Page 249: Autumn 1991]E

EPA

AND THE COURTS

governmental interference in private affairs and economic development,
because bubbling would allow sources locating in nonattainment areas an
additional avenue to avoid complying with expensive pollution abatement
requirements.
In upholding the new interpretation, the Court enunciated a now familiar
two-step analysis, which requires that in addressing issues of statutory
interpretation, the court first inquires "whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue." 20 6 If it is addressed, the court simply must
effectuate that intent, regardless of the agency's views. If not, then the court's
second task is to inquire whether the interpretation of the agency responsible
for implementing the statute is reasonable. If it is, the court must defer to it
rather than "simply impo[sing] its own construction on the statute." 20 7 In
Chevron itself, since EPA's interpretation represented a "reasonable
accommodation of manifestly competing interests," 20 8 the Court was bound
to accept this interpretation. The fact that this constituted a reversal of an
earlier policy position posed no special obstacle to judicial deference, for "an
agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may,
within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent
20 9
administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments."
Chevron, which has been described as a "watershed" opinion, 210 differs
from the early cases that postulate a judiciary/agency partnership in their
conception of how the modern administrative state should fit into the
framework of our tripartite system of government. While not unprecedented,
Chevron "invalidated what had been a rather common judicial method of
overwhelming agency interpretations" of their statutes. 2 1' In particular, its
rationale evidences no recognition of the possibility that, in the face of
statutory failure to speak to the precise question at issue, a court might
nevertheless draw on its understanding of the overall purposes or policy
objectives of the statute to evaluate the agency's interpretation.
Eschewing a search for legislative purposes in this way is consistent with
the pessimistic pluralist view of the legislative process as a "continuous series
of bargains," with any discrete piece of legislation being simply the "final
2 12
agreements hammered out by these factions," on this particular occasion.
Thus, Chevron's proponents typically begin defending the two-step framework
for analyzing statutory interpretation issues by recognizing that legislation is
the product of a struggle among competing interests and values.2 1 3 Kenneth
Starr, for example, while still a court of appeals judge, argued that "statutes
206. Id at 842.
207. Id at 843.
208. Id at 865.
209. Id.
210. Kenneth W. Starr, judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YaleJ Reg 283, 283 (1986).
211. Id at 295. Solicitor General Starr's article contains an excellent review of the precedents
prior to Chevron.
212. Daniel B. Rodriquez, The Substance of the .Vew Legal Process, 77 Cal L Rev 919, 922 (1989).
213. 467 US at 847 (Clean Air Act involved struggle between interests seeking to reduce
pollution rapidly and interests concerned that strict controls would retard industrial development).
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are rarely, if ever, unidimensionally directed towards achieving or vindicating
a single public policy." 21 4 Complex statutes, like the Clean Air Act, contain
many issues around which interests have clashed, compromised, and settled
on language. Each provision of these statutes is simply an agreement about a
particular item, and it should be construed as a court might construe a
contract. Although, according to this view, legislation resolves disputes, it
does not point in directions. If the statute does not answer the "precise
question at issue,"2 15 it has not spoken at all in a way that the courts can or
should use to resolve the question. Even when the members of Congress
reach a consensus on broad objectives, they often differ on the means for
achieving those goals. 2 16 As a result, even if a broad policy goal is "the
animating force driving the legislation, achievement of actual passage . . .
invariably requires compromise and accommodation.- 2 1 7 In the process,
"tradeoffs inevitably abound. That is what the legislative process is all
about."

2 18

The second complementary theme at work in Chevron is the rehabilitation
of the legitimacy of agency policymaking. In apparent disregard of the
lessons of agency capture, the Court acknowledges that the incumbent
administration can give effect to its own views of "wise policy,"2 1 9 within the
limits of the agency's delegated authority. This statement is either a cynical
concession that "policy" is always the product of interest group deals, so that
the executive's policy is as good as the Congress's on that score and the term
"wise" is being used facetiously, or it is an indication that suddenly the
executive branch is not seen as yet another arena in which bargains among
interest groups are hammered out, but as the originator of policy that may
indeed be "wise," in the old-fashioned sense of being publicly-minded.
Interpreting this aspect of Chevron in the second way squares with efforts to
rehabilitate the executive branch that have paralleled the effort to disparage
the Congress. As public choice has painted a depressingly pessimistic portrait
of Congress, some have responded by rehabilitating the executive branch to a
degree that ought to surprise the early proponents of agency capture. 2 20 It is
almost as if some "Law of Conservation of Respect for Government" has been
at work in the academy and on the bench, so that as respect for Congress
ebbed it had to flow to another branch.
214. NRDC v EPA, 822 F2d at 113.
215. Chevron, 467 US at 843.
216. Board of Governors v Dimension FinancialCorp., 474 US 361, 374 (1986). See also ContinentalAir
Lines, Inc. v Department of Transportation,843 F2d 1444, 1450 (DC Cir 1988) ("But broad consensus on
noble objectives represents only the beginning of the legislative process.").
217. NRDC v EPA, 822 F2d at 113. See also Dimension FinancialCorp., 474 US at 374 ("The final
language of the legislation may reflect hard-fought compromises.
218. ContinentalAir Lines, 843 F2d at 1450.
219. 467 US at 856.
220. See, for example, the recent symposium, The PresidencY and Congress: ConstitutioiiallySeparated
and Shared Powers, 68 Wash U L Q485- 7 06 (1990). The conference whose proceedings are reported
here was two days long, with the first day devoted to exalting the importance of the unitary executive
and the second devoted to Congress-bashing.
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While the drumbeat of capture theory does continue, the positive traits of
executive policymaking are being newly appreciated, including the political
accountability of the president, agency expertise, 2 2' the ability of each specific
agency to coordinate its own activities, and the ability of the Executive Office
to coordinate domestic policy across agencies.
The cumulative effect of these changes is a reconstructed theoretical case
for extreme judicial deference to agency judgments that helps provide the
basis for Chevron's two-step framework for analyzing issues of statutory
interpretation. 2 22 If a legislative resolution of clashing private interests is
sufficiently clear in the context of a particular issue raised before an agency
responsible for implementing the statute, the agency, and subsequently a
court, must, under Chevron's first step, "give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress." 2 23 More often, however, the legislature will
not state with sufficient specificity how it wants the agency to resolve a
particular conflict, either because it never considered the precise question or
was unable to reach a consensus on that level.2 24 Chevron recognized that, in
these circumstances, it is appropriate for Congress to delegate to the agency
the authority to reconcile conflicting statutory policies.2 2 5 Indeed, in postChevron environmental cases, "Congressional silence is deemed an implicit
delegation of power to an agency to make policy choices" that reasonably
221. See, for example, Stewart, 92 Yale LJ at 1565 nlOl (cited in note 176).
222. While Chevron deference has been the most prominent response to these influences, it is by
no means the only one. The political analysis sketched in the text has been endorsed by some
scholars and judges who have developed quite different normative conclusions from it. Other
proposals for judicial review include:
1. Reviving the delegation doctrine. See, for example, Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn &
Glen 0. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 Cornell L Rev 1 (1982). The rationale
behind this proposal begins with the observation that special interests may frequently prefer
the "policy lottery" that results when the Congress passes vague legislation, sometimes
because they have been unable to mass a decisive coalition in the Congress for a clear
statutory victory, sometimes because vague language in the statute may successfully mask
their true self-interested, rent-seeking motives, thus making it less likely that the legislation
will stimulate sharp opposition. Requiring legislation to be more specific thus can flush out
rent-seeking motivations and make passing such legislation more difficult.
2. Adopting a rule of parsimonious construction. See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook,
Statutes' Domains, 50 U Chi L Rev 533, 544 (1983). Under this proposal, judges should
enforce the legislative deals that have been struck but no more. Whenever there exists
judicial doubt about whether the statute authorizes an agency to act, the court should
conclude that it does not, on the ground that the deal has not been clearly enough reduced
to writing to be binding on the courts. The rationale for such a construction rule is that (1)
it recognizes the supremacy of the representative branches of government when these
branches speak clearly; (2) it fails to romanticize the process of making deals, understanding
that the product of legislation is typically to lock in rents for a successful party and that such
a result is typically welfare-diminishing; and (3) it employs a presumption in favor of
individual freedom from government interference whenever doubt exists about whether a
deal has in fact been struck.
3. Interpreting legislation as if it were public-regarding. See, for example, Macey, 86 Colum L
Rev 223 (cited in note 168).
223. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 US at 842-43.
224. Id at 865.
225. Id. See also NRDC v EPA, 859 F2d at 199 (noting that "it falls to the agency to reconcile
competing legislative goals").
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accommodate

conflicting

statutory

goals. 2 2 6

Such

delegations

are

unobjectionable, according to Chevron, because:
[W]hile agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and
it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such
policy choices-resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally
left to be resolved by the agency
2 27
charged with administration of the statute.

Justice Scalia has written that policy decisions "are supposed to be political
ones-made by institutions whose managers change with each presidential
election and which are under the constant political pressure of the
congressional authorization and appropriations processes." 2 28 The agency's
responsibility, he adds, is to act "within the broad bounds of rationality-to
follow the popular will, expressed directly and through the political structures
2 29
of the executive and legislative branches."
If a policy question delegated to and resolved by the agency is challenged
in court,
federal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy
choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such
policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public
interest are not judicial
ones: "Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the
2 30
political branches."

Similarly, in Justice Scalia's view, the courts' obligation to refrain from
interfering in an agency's policy judgments thus "has less to do with
'unsuitability' 23 ' than with lack of political accountability." 23 2 As the Dictrict
226.

Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v EPA, 859 F2d 977, 984 (DC Cir 1988); Ohio v Department of the Interior,

880 F2d 432, 441 (DC Cir 1989). See also Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 US at 843-44 ("If Congress has
explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation."); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v EPA, 899 F2d 344,
354 (5th Cir 1990) (Congress is deemed to have implicitly delegated to EPA the power to define key
statutory terms); Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v EPA, 861 F2d 270, 291 (DC Cir 1988) (EPA's

resolution of the tradeoff between conflicting statutory goals "is the essence of the discretion
Congress has delegated it.").
227.

Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 US at 865-66. Compare Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v NRDC, 462 US

87, 97 (1983) (Resolution of fundamental policy questions lies with Congress, the agencies to which
Congress has delegated authority "and, ultimately, the populace as a whole.").
228.

Antonin Scalia, Responsibilities of Regulatory Agencies under Environmental Laws, 24 Houston L

Rev 97, 107 (1987).
229. Id at 107-08.
230. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 US at 866, quoting TVA v Hill, 437 US 153, 195 (1978).
231. Proponents of a limited judicial role in reviewing agency decisionmaking, however, also
point to the courts' limited institutional capacity to understand the complex technical issues involved
in environmental policymaking. See text accompanying notes 256-59.
232. Scalia, 24 Houston L Rev at 107 (cited in note 228). See also F. Henry Habicht, Jr., Responses
to Justice Antonin Scalia, 24 Houston L Rev 111, 112 (1987) ("Permitting unfettered second-guessing
of [an agency's balancing of competing policies] by unaccountable institutions such as the courts
would effectively grant them broad policymaking authority and could have serious implications for
our constitutional system.").
Some commentators disagree with this view of the political accountability of the courts. Judge
Oakes, for example, has argued that both the judicial system itself and the political process assure
some degree of judicial political accountability. See James L. Oakes, The Judicial Role in Environmental
Lau?, 52 NYU L Rev 498, 514-16 (1977); Oakes, 7 Envir L Rptr at 50031-33 (cited in note 75) (The
"greatest strength of substantive judicial review" is "that it is simply one part of an ongoing political
process, in which all sides can seek to influence ultimate outcomes through many channels, in the
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of Columbia Circuit states, this obligation "springs from fundamental
principles of separation of powers.

233

The Chevron framework for resolving statutory interpretation issues is thus
meant to prevent courts from improperly encroaching upon the domain of the
political branches.2 3 4 In situations in which "Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue ' 23 5 (Chevron's step two), a reasonable
interpretation by the agency typically represents an accommodation of
conflicting policies that the legislature desired the agency to balance or
reconcile. If a court refuses to defer to such an accommodation on the
ground that it is inconsistent with some overriding goal reflected in the
legislation, such as protection of the environment, the court runs the risk of
tearing apart the legislative compromise. 23 6 A court that refuses to defer to
an agency's reasonable interpretation under Chevron's step two promotes
"revisionist alterations of the final results of the legislative process. "237 This
presents "anti-democratic dangers," 2 3 8 for statutory ambiguity "may well be
the deliberate result of competing and warring legislative forces striving to
2 39
achieve essentially incompatible results in a single piece of legislation."
Judicial refusal to permit the agency to resolve the ambiguity, and thus to
choose among the warring objectives, "portends a judicial supplanting of a
key actor in the drama, namely the agency itself, present on stage at Congress'
express direction." 2 40 Accordingly, courts must be careful not to transform
their proper and limited role into the role assigned to the agency by
"searching for the interpretive approach that 'best promotes' the legislative
'purpose' in question."' 24 1

It is the agency's job to choose the optimal

best tradition of democratic pluralism."). See also Stewart, 62 Iowa L Rev at 714 (cited in note 107)
("[I]n a few instances, basic defects in existing political processes justify court action beyond the
normal bounds of judicial review.").
233. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 843 F2d 1444, 1449.
234. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 US at 843-45, 864-66.
235. Id at 843.
236. See American Mining Congress v EPA, 825 F2d 1177, 1185, 1187 (DC Cir 1987); ContinentalAir
Lines, Inc., 843 F2d 1450. See also Board of Governors v Dimension Financial Corp., 474 US 361, 374
(1986) (Ignoring legislative compromises "prevents the effectuation of congressional intent.").
237. Continental Air Lines, 843 F2d at 1451. See also id (Chevron formulation reflects concerns
"about judicial unwinding of deals struck in Congress.").
238. Id at 1450, 1451. The most forceful advocate of this line of analysis has been Judge Starr,
formerly of the D.C. Circuit. His description in a non-environmental case of the dangers ofjudicial
overreaching is typical:
Acts of Congress may well have a unifying theme and central thrust, but the felt necessities
of the legislative process inevitably produce more narrowly focused provisions which fail in
full rigor to effectuate the overarching goal. And the hard fact remains that it is not the
judiciary's assigned task to sit as a modern-day Council of Revision overseeing the
administrative state and to cy pres statutory provisions that may not be in full keeping with
the spirit that has . . . animated Congress. As in other areas, we must bear firmly in mind
"the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."
InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters v ICC. 801 F2d 1423, 1430 (DC Cir 1986). Judge Starr has made
the same argument, though less colorfully, in environmental cases. See American .MiningCongress v
EPA, 824 F2d at 1187 (DC Cir 1987); ARDC v EPA, 822 F2d at 113. See also Hazardous Waste
Treatment Council v EPA, 861 F2d 270, 291 (DC Cir 1988) (Judge Buckley).
239. Continental Air Lines, 843 F2d at 1451.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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tradeoffs among conflicting goals. According to those who endorse the
Chevron approach, "It]hat is the essence of policymaking. And if one thing
should be clear, it is that courts are not to engage (at least in the arena of
' 242
judicial review of agency action) in substantive policymaking.
The idea that judges must refrain from rewriting legislative deals further
explains why, as compared to the earlier environmental cases, the recent cases
display little special solicitude for environmental interest groups. Any
heightened receptivity to the arguments or objectives of such groups would
invite "[l]osers in the Congress (or, more precisely, partial winners who may
view themselves as losers) [to] eschew ... the democratic process and instead
enter ... the litigation arena." 2 43 Judicial intervention at the behest of these

"losers" would thus defeat statutory "goals" by creating a different balance of
2 44
interests than Congress intended.

The case for judicial deference reflected in Chevron has been made even
stronger by certain refinements in the theory of pessimistic pluralism as
applied to environmental legislation. These refinements have been
stimulated by the inability of the logic of collective action to explain why we
have witnessed such a flood of environmental protection legislation in the
past twenty years. At first blush, it would seem that the interest groups that
enjoy organizational advantage in the bargaining over environmental
protection legislation are the groups that oppose stringent legislation.
Individual firms, industrial firms as groups, and labor organizations all can
line up in opposition to tough environmental measures that threaten their
economic self-interest, and all would seem better able to tilt legislative deals
to their advantage compared with individual citizens concerned about
environmental protection and the groups that organize to represent their
interests. The former groups share characteristics that should give them
collective action advantages: they tend to be fewer in number, hence easier to
organize, and the economic burdens of environmental controls are frequently
242. Id. See also Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v NRDC, 470 US 116, 134 (1985) (Courts "do not sit to
judge the relative wisdom of competing statutory interpretations."); National Tank Truck Carriers,Inc.
v EPA, 907 F2d 177, 182-83 (DC Cir 1990).
243. Continental Air Lines, 843 F2d at 1450. ProfessorJeremy A. Rabkin has decried the tendency
of public interest groups in administrative litigation to "obtain something akin to the authority of
medieval lords, speaking for their vassals and serfs as their natural representative." Stephen F.
Williams, Book Review, 68 Tex L Rev 1303, 1310 (1990), quoting Jeremy A. Rabkin, ed, Judicial
Compulsions: How Public Law Distorts Public Policy 43 (1989). Compare Interview: William Ruckelshaus, 5
Nat Resources & Envir 36, 38 (Summer 1990) (Citizen environmental groups have played the
dominant role in implementing environmental laws by using the courts.).
244. See Hazardous Wl'aste Treatment Council, 861 F2d 277, 283 (DC Cir 1988). At least one judge
has concluded that the standing requirement is perhaps applied more liberally "when at stake are the
great public policy considerations of insults to our environment." Public Interest Research Group v
Powell Duifryn Terminals Inc., 913 F2d 64, 89 (3d Cir 1990) (Aldisert concurring). Judge Aldisert,
however, is less certain of this conclusion than he was before the Supreme Court's recent decision
finding that an environmental group lacked standing to challenge decisions by the Bureau of Land
Management to terminate public land withdrawals. Lujan v N\ational llildlife Federation, 110 S Ct 3177
(1990). InJudge Aldisert's view, Lujan "sent a strong signal to all of us: [The Court] was not, repeat
not, totally relaxing standing requirements in cases affecting the environment." 913 F2d at 84
(Aldisert concurring).
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highly concentrated on them, hence they have strong incentives to organize.
The latter groups, on the other hand, have to coordinate the interests of much
broader groups, each of whom suffers relatively minor damage to its selfinterest. If any environmental legislation is produced at all in this context,
pessimistic pluralist theory would seem to suggest that it would redistribute
wealth away from environmental consumers and toward regulated firms.
While some aspects of environmental legislation might fit that description,
245
much of it plainly does not.

This paradox can be partially resolved by bringing politicians themselves
back into the analysis. If politicians sense that they can use environmental
issues to their electoral advantage, because they have become politically
salient for a large number of voters, they may attempt to secure that
advantage by promoting stringent environmental legislation. Politicians,
indeed, may become electoral "entrepreneurs," supplying the legislative
2 46
product-tough environmental legislation-that consumers want.

If pessimistic pluralism rested here, it would have offered an explanation
of environmental legislation that was still not totally satisfying, because it
would not have taken into account any residual 'role for those still-powerful
groups generally opposed to stiff regulation. Pluralism argues that politicians
greatly prefer acting on public policy in nonconflictual contexts when they can
funnel benefits to favored groups in relative obscurity without risking the ire
of disadvantaged groups. 24 7 The entrepreneurial story of legislative
enactment hardly seems nonconflictual, because regulated interests are going
to be well aware whose ox is being gored and, on the assumptions of public
choice, will try to do something about it, presumably by expressing
displeasure at the politicians who have wronged them.
A more stable explanation for tough environmental legislation becomes
feasible once some space is introduced between enacting legislation and
implementing it. If Congress can satisfy its environmental consumer
constituents by enacting legislation, it may then be able to satisfy its
regulated-interests constituency through lax implementation. Less-thanvigorous implementation might be accomplished by writing ample procedural
protections into regulatory measures, ensuring that the regulatory process
grinds slowly; by under-funding agency enforcement offices and regulation
writing staff, or by ignoring deals made between the regulated interests and
the agency. However it is done, exploiting the potential gaps between
245. For example, James Q Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in James Q Wilson, ed, The Politics of
Regulation 357, 370 (Basic Books, 1980) ("Since the incentive to organize is strong for opponents of
[antipollution] policy, but weak for the beneficiaries, and since the political system provides many
points at which opposition can be registered, it may seem astonishing that regulatory legislation of
this sort is ever passed.").
246. For example, id at 370. Wilson ascribed entrepreneurial status to individuals such as Ralph
Nader, and considered such political leaders as Senator Muskie to be a political "ally" of such
entrepreneurs. It is fair to consider them both as entrepreneurs-individuals such as Nader
consolidating the demand for legislative product, individuals such as Muskie supplying the product.
247. See, for example, Eskridge, 74 Va L Rev at 285-95 (cited in note 167), and sources cited.
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enactment and implementation effectively allows political entrepreneurs to
differentiate their product according to its relevant market.
This account of environmental legislation, refined to take into account the
processes of lawmaking and implementation, produces an evaluation of
congressional behavior that remains "pretty grim." In this model, Congress
is seen as passing stringent legislation to attract environmental consumer
support, but it is legislation that Congress does not want enforced as written.
Years ago Congressman Jamie L. Whitten expressed a similar thought by
remarking that "sometimes a fellow might feel that if he writes a law three
times as strong as he wants it to be, maybe it will be carried out 100
percent. ' ' 248 For a while, such legislation was typically described as
"aspirational," perhaps implying that it was high-minded, albeit unrealistic; 24 9

lately it has rather been described as "symbolic," suggesting that it was
perhaps not even intended to be enforced.2 5 0
To say that Congress is passing symbolic legislation comes very close to
saying that it passes laws not to make public policy. At most, passing a law
initiates the process whereby policy will be made. The process continues as
the administrative agency struggles to develop "wise policy" in the context of
executive branch and congressional oversight that dominates regulatory
decisionmaking once formal laws have been enacted.
This interpretation of the policymaking process reinforces Chevron
deference; perhaps it even makes that deference constitutionally compelled.
If symbolic legislation cannot generally be viewed as a source of policy or
public purpose, the only points at which such legislation seems to supply
justiciable material are when specific deals can in fact be identified. Carried
further, however, the idea that symbolic legislation is not intended to be
enforced might suggest that it is not yet functionally "law" at all, in which case
courts being asked to interpret the statute would lack any law to apply.
So the interpretation of environmental legislation as merely symbolic
further reinforces deference to the executive by practically eliminating
legislation as an expression of public policy. Examined from another angle,
the matter might be put this way: within the sphere of government action
circumscribed by a piece of symbolic legislation, it is impossible to say what
public policy is until the regulatory process begins producing regulations and
enforcement. If that is so, it is difficult to imagine what role there could be for
the courts in reviewing agency output, short of policing constitutional
boundaries. The standard premise of such review, namely that courts are to
ensure that agencies carry out the policy decisions reached by Congress,
would have to be rejected because, by hypothesis, there have been no such
248. Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations for
Fiscal Year 1973, Hearings before the Subcommittee on HUD-Independent Agencies of the House
Committee on Appropriations, 92d Cong, 2d Sess 350 (1972).
249. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Richard N. Pearson, Inplementing FederalEnvironmental Policies: The
Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78 Colum L Rev 1429 (1978).
250. John P. Dwyer, The Pathology, of Symbolic Legislation, 17 Econ L Q233 (1990).
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policy decisions reached until the agency acts, at which
correspondence between action and policy will be perfect.

time

the

4. The Upshot. Pessimistic pluralism, the downgrading of environmental
values, and the rehabilitation of the executive branch have combined recently
to change the perception and nature of judicial review of EPA action.
Whereas in the early cases the courts stressed their obligation to ensure the
consistency of administrative decisions with congressional intent, more
recently they have focused on their obligation to refrain from making
independent policy judgments and from interfering in the decisions of the
political branches of government.
The Chevron test for reviewing an agency's statutory interpretations is the
centerpiece of this recent shift in judicial emphasis. But the courts have
displayed a similar reluctance to second guess the agency's procedural
choices, factual determinations, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, statutory
implementation, sometimes using the same rationale as the one upon which
Chevron's principles are based. Thus, in Vermont Yankee, decided several years
before Chevron, the Supreme Court abruptly ended the courts' earlier practice
of requiring innovative agency procedures, 25 1 concluding that when Congress
passed the Administrative Procedure Act, 252 it intended that the agencies, not

the courts, should exercise discretion in determining when "extra"
procedural devices should be employed. 2 53 Judicial tinkering with the
procedures chosen by the agency would "totally disrupt the statutory scheme,
through which Congress enacted 'a formula upon which opposing social and
political forces have come to rest.' "254 According to Professor Donald
Stever, Vermont Yankee leaves courts with only two choices in many
environmental cases: undertake "the excruciatingly in-depth review"
characteristic of the early cases or "essentially abdicat[e] the review function
2 55
where technical matters are at issue."-

Recitations of the need to defer to the agency on complex scientific and
technical issues have long been commonplace in environmental cases, 2 56 and
they have continued to appear in the recent cases. 2 57 What is more unusual is
251. See text accompanying notes 112-23.
252. 5 USC §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1988).
253. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v NRDC, 435 US 519, 546 (1978).
254. Id at 547, quoting IVong Yang Sung v McGrath, 339 US 33, 40 (1950). See also id at 549
(Courts should not "impose upon the agency [their) own notion of which procedures are 'best' or
most likely to further some vague, undefined public good.").
255. Donald W. Stever, Jr., Deference to Administrative Agencies in Federal Environmental, Health and
Safety Litigation-Thoughtson Va rying JudicialApplication of the Role, 6 W New Eng L Rev 35, 54 (1983).
256. See note 152.
257. See, for example, Pennsylvania v EPA, 932 F2d 269, 272 (3d Cir 1991); Her Majesty the Queen in
Right of Ontario v EPA, 912 F2d 1525, 1534 (DC Cir 1990); NRDC v EPA, 902 F2d 962, 968 (DC Cir
1990); Browning-FerrsInd. v Muszynski, 899 F2d 151, 161 (2d Cir 1990); Colorado v Department of the
Interior, 880 F2d 481,489 (DC Cir 1989). In NRDC v EPA, 824 F2d 1211, the court warned that "it is
not for the judicial branch to undertake comparative evaluations of conflicting scientific evidence."
Id at 1216. Compare Baltimore Gas &Elec. Co., 462 US at 103 (1983) (reviewing court must be "at its
most deferential" when examining predictions within an agency's special expertise, at the frontiers of
science). But see Chemical lfrs. Ass'n v EPA, 870 F2d 177. 199 (5th Cir 1989), citing Portland Cement
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the kind of explanation for such deference that has begun to surface. The
obligation to defer, according to some, stems from more than just the relative
competencies of agencies and courts in understanding technically complex
matters. As Justice Scalia has pointed out, finding facts is one of the things
courts do

best. 2 58

In his view, an important reason why Congress establishes

agencies and vests in them factfinding powers is to produce a decision in
which a close question "go(es) to the side favored by the current political
climate.- 2 59 A judicial refusal to defer to agencies on factual matters
frustrates that legislative objective.
Today, judicial review in environmental cases containing mixed questions
of fact and law, which involve the application of statutes and regulations to
facts determined by an agency, also proceeds on the assumption that courts
260
have a limited role in assessing the propriety of an agency's policy choices.
Yet the courts seem to have interpreted the Supreme Court's recent
description in the State Farm case 26 1 of the judicial role in reviewing statutory
implementation as an endorsement of the notion that deference does not
mean abdication of the judicial responsibility to ensure "reasoned"
decisionmaking by the agency. 262 Indeed, the courts have determined in a
significant number of recent decisions that EPA acted arbitrarily or without
sufficient explanation. 26 3 The persistence of a meaningful judicial role in this
context despite the courts' recent emphasis on removing themselves from
policy decisions may be attributable to a perception that the Supreme Court
has been sending mixed signals in cases like Baltimore Gas & Electric 2 64 and
State Farm. 26 5 As the Fifth Circuit noted recently, the Court's decisions "seem

to embody two different approaches that are 'analytically in conflict "with the
Ass'n, 486 F2d at 402; South Terminal Corp., 504 F2d at 663-66 (The reviewing court "must 'steep'
itself in technical matters sufficiently to determine whether the agency 'has exercised reasoned
discretion.' ").
258. Scalia, 24 Houston L Rev at 107 (cited in note 228).
259. Id.
260. See, for example, Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 462 US at 105-06; Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, 870 F2d at
200 (recognizing judicial limitations in assessing policy decisions). In ContinentalAir Lines, Inc., 843
F2d 1444,Judge Starr described as "judicial intervention run riot" a court's refusal to respect, in the
context of review of statutory implementation, the agency's resolution of conflicting statutory goals.
Id at 1452. Carried out correctly, he said, "arbitrary-and-capricious style review does not put the
court into the [agency's] driver's seat." Id at 1451.
261. Ml'otor Vehicle ,Vfrs. Ass'n v State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 US 29 (1983). In that case, the
Court upheld the lower court's decision overturning the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration's rescission of a regulation requiring automobile manufacturers to install passive
restraints. The Court deemed the rescission arbitrary and capricious because the agency's
explanations were insufficient to comply with its obligation to engage in "reasoned decisionmaking."
Id at 52.
262. See, for example, American Mining Congress, 907 F2d at 1187. Compare NRDC v EPA, 902
F2d at 988 (court should not blindly accept agency's claim that decisions are still being studied);
Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v EPA, 870 F2d at 198 (According deference to an agency's statutory
interpretation does not mean "rubber-stamping" that decision.).
263. See, for example, American iining Congress, 907 F2d at 1187-91; National Tank Truck Carriers,
Inc. v EPA, 907 F2d 177, 184-85 (DC Cir 1990); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v EPA, 899 F2d at 359-60; .\RDC
v EPA, 859 F2d at 210.
264. Baltimniore Gas & Elec. Co., 462 US 87.
265. State Fari, 463 US 29.
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result that a court of appeals must choose the one it deems more appropriate
for the case at hand."' ... 266
This confusion notwithstanding, some judges and commentators, under
the influence of pessimistic pluralist political theory, recently have come to
view the legislative arena as a battleground among warring private factions.
Frequently, those factions are unable to reach a complete accommodation, a
task which the legislature instead delegates to the agency. In this view, agency
resolution of the policy conflicts Congress left unresolved is appropriate
because agency decisions are subject to the supervision of the president, who
is directly accountable to the electorate. Judges who adopt this conception of
the legislative and administrative process accept the responsibility for calling
the agency to task if its decisions conflict with clear and specific legislative
intent. Outside this limited context, however, intervention by unelected
judges can only interfere with the Constitution's allocation of policymaking
responsibility in the political, accountable branches of government. The
result has been a shift in emphasis, best reflected in Chevron and its progeny,
away from the early focus on the need for judicial supervision of agency
conformance to legislative intent and toward the courts' obligation not to
interfere with the decisions of the political branches.
IV
EVALUATING JUDICIAL REVIEW

The rhetoric and doctrine of judicial review facing EPA has changed
significantly since EPA was created in 1970. To this point, this article has
focused on the explanations for these changes, by tracing them to a further set
of developments in three political assumptions that inform the judiciary's
understanding of the legislative process, of the capacities of the executive
branch, and of the national importance of environmental values. Judicial
review has receded in recent years because the judiciary and the scholarly
community that influences judicial thinking have come to embrace a set of
political beliefs different from those in place at EPA's creation. To this extent,
then, law and politics are not autonomous disciplines.
Explaining these changes entails looking backwards, to their origins. Once
we have the changes in mind, we can also look forward to evaluate them.
Regardless of their origins, and in light of EPA's present responsibilities and
agenda, is less aggressive judicial review superior to more aggressive review?
Much of the recent literature on judicial review of administrative action takes
266. ChemicalAifrs. Ass 'n,
870 F2d at 200, quoting H. Craft Clothing Co. vNLRB, 660 F2d 910, 91314 (3d Cir 1981); Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v Dellaventura, 544 F2d 35, 49 (2d Cir 1976), aff'd sub nom,
Xortheast ,lareTerminal Co. v Caputo, 432 US 249 (1977). The court in ChemicalMfrs. Ass'n suggested
that courts determine the appropriate degree of deference in reviewing an agency's statutory
implementation by balancing a variety of factors, including the fact-law dichotomy; whether the issue
is one concerning which courts or agencies have superior competence: whether the issue turns on the
agency's interpretation of its own authorizing statute; and the validity of the agency's reasoning.
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up the question of the costs and benefits of less aggressive judicial review. 26 7
Given the nature of the symposium of which this article is a part, it is useful in
our remaining space to turn to the question of evaluation.
If judicial doctrine could be evaluated by reference to criteria that do not
engage contested political questions, evaluating judicial review might provide
a means of rehabilitating the autonomy of law from politics. If such
evaluation were possible, it would be possible to describe a method of legal
reasoning that skirts the stormy debates of politics. As a matter of strictly
legal professionalism, legal scholars might restrict their function to careful
analysis of which doctrines work best, or which seem most effective in
accomplishing the aims of the administrative state, regardless of what those
aims may be.
In the course of reviewing the pros and cons of aggressive judicial review,
we argue that distinguishing law from politics in this way proves no more
successful than the previous attempt. The costs and benefits of the institution
of judicial review cannot be appraised without taking a position on the same
sort of political assumptions we have just finished canvassing. Furthermore,
empirical evidence cannot resolve the dispute over the assumptions
themselves. Hence, appraising the costs and benefits of judicial review can
only occur from within a contestable political perspective.
Although evaluating the costs and benefits of judicial review cannot
ultimately be reduced to an empirical process, it would be a serious mistake to
underappreciate the important role empirical evidence can play in that task.
Whatever the political assumptions, there are important empirical questions
to be analyzed. How, if at all, has judicial review transformed agency
behavior; how, if at all, does it affect the physical environment; what are its
monetary costs, both in the individual case and systemically; and are there
alternatives that accomplish at least some of the same functions at less costs?
Some interesting work has recently been done to improve our information in
these areas. 268 These and other empirical findings would force at least a
partial reappraisal of judicial review even if the political assumptions of the
earlier era had remained in place.
In this concluding section, we sketch what we know about the costs and
benefits of aggressive judicial review, highlight the junctures at which
evaluating costs and benefits depends significantly on political assumptions,
identify some considerations that would count against aggressive judicial
review even under the earlier political assumptions, and raise several
267. See, for example, Strauss, 1989 Duke LJ 538 (cited in note 2); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs
and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency Action, 1989 Duke L J 522.
268. The studies are of two kinds, case study and statistical. Significant case studies include Jerry
L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety (Harv U Press, 1990); R. Shep Melnick,
Regulation and the Courts.- The Case of the Clean AirAct (Brookings Inst, 1983); Marc K. Landy, Marc J.
Roberts & Stephen R. Thomas, The Environmental Protection Agency Asking the l1rong Questions (Oxford
U Press, 1990) ("EPA, Asking the Wrong Questions"); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the
Chevron Station: An Enipirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 Duke LJ 984.
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questions about the validity and desirability of the assumptions of pessimistic
pluralism.
Two broad sets of criteria bear on any evaluation of judicial review: (1)
rule of law values of accuracy, consistency with statutory command,
predictability, and rational basis; and (2) substantive goals such2 69as efficiency,
protection of environmental quality, or income redistribution.
Sometimes these criteria will both be served by the same act of judicial
review, but sometimes they will be in conflict. They were in conflict in TVA v.
Hill, "27 ° where the Court interpreted the Endangered Species Act according to
its plain meaning, thereby refusing to permit the Tennessee Valley Authority
to complete the nearly completed Tellico Dam when doing so would destroy
the habitat of the snail darter, an endangered species. The ruling served rule
of law values, because the Congress had self-consciously written a law that
admitted of no exceptions, but did not advance the substantive goal of
2 7 1 the
allocational efficiency. On the other hand, in the Cotton Dust decision,
Court permitted OSHA to set stricter standards for workplace exposure to
toxics than a cost-benefit analysis would justify. That decision advanced both
rule of law goals and the substantive goal of protecting worker health, because
an acceptance of cost-benefit principles in that context would have been
contrary to the statute that Congress had enacted, and also would have
272
resulted in less worker protection.
Part of the problem in evaluating the institution of judicial review is that
modifications that advance values in one category, for instance by making
rulemaking less administratively expensive, can retard values in the other
category, for instance by increasing the frequency with which agencies deviate
269. Prior analyses of the value of procedures such as judicial review have employed different
categories, typically three or four in number. Roger Cramton, for example, proposes the criteria of
accuracy, efficiency, and acceptability; Jerry L. Mashaw, those of accuracy, fairness, and timeliness;
Paul Verkuil has suggested fairness, efficiency, and satisfaction; while Cass R. Sunstein favors
legality, real-world improvements (a category he subdivides further into efficient resource allocation
and eclectic improvements), and legitimacy. See Roger S. Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearings
in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 U Va L Rev 585, 591-93 (1972);Jerry Mashaw, The Management Side of
Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness and Timeliness in the
Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 Cornell L Rev 772, 774-76 (1974); Paul Verkuil, The Emerging
Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 Colum L Rev 258, 280 (1978); Sunstein, 1989 Duke LJ at 522-26
(cited in note 267). Each of these combinations has its merits. The organization we have adopted
isolates the criteria that appear to be more immune to political considerations (rule of law
considerations) from those that appear more politically sensitive (substantive goals). In the
remainder of this section, we argue that, in fact, the value or worth of the rule of law considerations
cannot be determined independently of political assumptions. See text accompanying notes 273-91.
In addition, trade offs across categories also implicate political considerations. See text
accompanying notes 270-72.
270. Tennessee V'alley Authority v Hill, 437 US 153 (1978).
271. American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v Donovan, 452 US 490 (198 1) ("Cotton Dust"). The
feasibility analysis sanctioned by Justice Brennan's opinion for the court does not always lead to
more stringent controls than cost-benefit analysis would, but the opinion seems to have assumed that
it would in fact do so in this case, and perhaps in the typical case.
272. As Cotton Dust indicates, conflicts within each of the two sets of criteria can also arise. In
Cotton Dust, worker health protection conflicted with allocative efficiency objectives if the regulatory
standard were stricter than cost-benefit analysis could justify. See also note 291, suggesting that
Cotton Dust might be diflerently decided today because of the increasing stress on allocative efficiency.
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from congressional policy decisions. These values, if they are to be
compared, require some normative or conceptual grid. Otherwise, they are
incommensurable. Insofar as such a grid depends upon some vision of the
good society, as it would seem it must, political assumptions will be
irreducibly implicated.
The intertwining of law and politics in evaluating judicial review runs
deeper than this. Even within the broad category of rule of law values,
assessing the size or substantiality of rule of law gains or losses depends upon
some political understandings.
In the present context, the political question is not whether the rule of law
is a value worth preserving. The question is what sort of judicial review
preserves that value. Both old school aggressive reviewers and new school
passive reviewers accept rule of law orthodoxy: when the rule of law conflicts
with substantive goals, a judge's job is to vindicate the rule of law. Absent
constitutional constraints, when Congress has made law by enacting
legislation, consistency with statutory command is one of the paramount
elements of these rule of law values. So, should Congress enact legislation
that is environmentally harmful in one respect or another, it is not part of a
court's task to improve the substantive consequences of the legislation at the
cost of violating the rule of law. By the same token, should Congress enact a
law that ignores cost-benefit considerations, it is not part of a court's task to
read that legislation to require the balancing of costs and benefits. Command
and control regulation gets roundly criticized these days, especially when it
pursues best available technology strategies instead of more market-oriented
ones, 2 73 yet, if Congress enacts such legislation, it would be wrong to expect
courts to reinterpret that legislation to permit more market-oriented
approaches.2 74 Petitions for the redress of that grievance should be
addressed to the policymaking branches. In other words, judges should
interpret the law, not legislate from the bench. This much seems to be
2 75
common ground between the earlier and the later eras of judicial review.
Both sides will agree, then, that any time the judiciary prevents executive
branch deviation from the rule of law by deciding a case brought before it,
rule of law values have been advanced. Additionally, both sides agree that
such judicial decisions can have desirable systematic consequences beyond
the specific case. Agencies act in anticipation of the requirements of judicial
review. To the extent that judicial readiness to declare what the law is induces
agencies to bring their future activities into line with those declarations, rule
273. For example, Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 Stan
L Rev 1333 (1985).
274. Likewise, Craig N. Oren suggests that the complex detail of legislation like the Clean Air Act
can submerge rather than elucidate policy questions and thus make it impossible for legislature,
executive orjudiciary alike to address basic policy questions or resolve ambiguity." Craig N. Oren,
Detail and Delegation: A Stud' in Statutory Specificity, 15 ColumJ Envir L 143, 146 (1990). Yet it is not in
general a function of the judicial office to make complicated statutes more simple.
275. We should stress that the orthodox view summarized here is itself the product of political
assumptions about a judge's proper role. They are simply assumptions that have remained constant
during a period in which other assumptions have been shifting.
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of law values are advanced further. Anticipating judicial review may simply
result in the agency conscientiously carrying out the law as interpreted by the
court; 2 7 6 it may also result in giving needed leverage to those within the
agency who urge that available data be seriously considered and carefully
27 7
analyzed.
These rule of law advantages have to be balanced against two kinds of
costs produced by judicial review. For one thing, complying with the
requirements of judicial review, even when it is accurately done, is costly,
sometimes in ways that have only recently come to be appreciated. Perfecting
a record that will survive judicial review may make individual rules too
expensive to write, 2 78 reducing total agency workproduct, 27 9 forcing agency
resources away from the rulemaking area into other, less productive forms of
regulation, 2 0 or thwarting innovative approaches to substantive problems. 28 '
Judicial review also may give lawyers undue leverage inside the agency
compared to policy experts, economists, or politicians, whose views may be
substantively superior.2 8 2 Furthermore, judicial review, operating as it does
on a piecemeal basis, seems particularly unlikely to advance the objective of
coordinating an increasingly complex environmental policy, let alone of
coordinating it with other pressing items on the domestic or foreign policy
agendas. 28 3 This may be true even when the vast majority of individual
decisions are correct.
276. In their statistical study, Professors Schuck and Elliott see this effect as one explanation for
why reversals and remands of agency action declined monotonically from 1965 to 1985. Hard look
review may indeed have been hard, but agencies have been adept at coping with it. "As the
administrative state has matured, courts and the agencies have come to know one another better; the
dictates of administrative law have become clearer; and agencies have found it less difficult to satisfy
reviewing courts, at least in the overwhelming body of their caseload that does not lie at the
developing frontiers of the law." Schuck & Elliott, 1990 Duke LJ at 1011 (cited in note 268).
277. Pedersen, 85 Yale LJ at 60 (cited in note 108).
278. See, for example, Strauss, 1989 Duke LJ at 540 (cited in note 2).
279. Id, citing Melnick, Regulation and the Courts 361-73 (cited in note 268).
280. Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety,
4 YaleJ Reg 257 (1987); Richard J. Pierce, Two Problems of Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the
District of Columbia Circuit and JudicialDeterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 Duke L J 300, 326.
281. The conflict between rule of law in the individual case and the systemic objectives of the
rulemaking process parallels an emerging concern within the civil justice system, where it is
becoming recognized that fairness or justice in the individual case may conflict with other values,
including fairness or justice in the system as a whole. As Judge Newman has observed, "Whether we
have too many cases or too few, or even, miraculously, precisely the right number, there can be little
doubt that the system is not working very well. Too many cases take too much time to be resolved
and impose too much cost upon litigants and taxpayers alike." Jon 0. Newman, Rethinking Fairness:
Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 Yale LJ 1643 (1985). On the systemic problems of civil justice,
see generally,Justice for All: Reducing the Cost and Delay in Civil Litigation (Brookings Inst, 1989).
282. See, for example, Administrative Law Symposium. Question and Answer with Professors Elliott,
Strauss, and Sunstein, 1989 Duke LJ 551, 551 (worrying about the overjudicialization of the agency).
See also Landy, Roberts & Thomas, EPA, Asking the JVrong Questions at 26 (cited in note 268) (Using
EPA's revision of the Clean Air Act's ozone standard as a case study, the authors argue that
anticipating judicial review resulted in the agency's Final Notice "[being] written as a legal brief for
the rule. It is even less informative and self-critical than the earlier document. In sum, it would be
very hard for someone to use it to understand either the science or the policy issues.").
283. For example, Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 99 Harv L Rev 1975 (1986) (arguing that White House review generally and OMB review
specifically advances goals of coordinating domestic and foreign policy agendas).
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These problems can be exacerbated, and new ones added, once one
concedes that courts sometimes err. The second general category of costs
that must be accounted for are the costs of error. One element of error costs
arises because judges may be substantively less competent than agencies, so
that their judicial interpretations may deflect the agency from accomplishing
its substantive mandate more effectively.
A second element of error costs arises whenever judges substitute their
policies for those of the politically accountable branches. The difficulty in
applying this uncontroversial generalization to the field of administrative law
occurs when one recognizes that legislative and executive branch policies do
not always coincide. When judges substitute Congress's policies for the
executive's, they are advancing the rule of law; when they substitute their own
policies for the executive's, they are retarding it. Identifying error, and hence
what counts as a cost, thus depends crucially on differentiating between
judicial actions that substitute the judges' policies for the agency's versus
those that substitute (enforce, vindicate, uphold) Congress's values for a
threatened departure by the agency. The heart of the disagreement between
the two schools of judicial review relates to this differentiation process. The
proponents of earlier aggressive judicial review and the proponents of
present, less aggressive review both assert that their approach best avoids the
second element of error costs by confining courts to the task of "applying
law." Indeed, both claim that their approach is necessary if all the law
Congress enacts is to be applied. 284 In particular, both distinguish
congressional policy from judicial policy in their own way, in a manner that
can be directly linked to the political changes we have been discussing.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the prevailing political model of
optimistic pluralism and Legal Process assigned Congress the primary policyenunciating role in the environmental

area. 28 5

Congress's activity was

understood as expressing policies and purposes, not merely as cutting
particularistic deals among interest groups competing over rents. Agency
capture theory abetted this interpretation by breeding a good deal of
skepticism about the desirability of giving regulatory agencies too much
flexibility to "innovate," fearing that this frequently meant failing to
implement congressionally mandated policy. 28 6 Overton Park is an example of

the hard look review that resulted. Lately, the combination of pessimistic
pluralism's attack on Congress as another forum for self-interested bargaining
and deals, and the resurgent faith in executive competence has reversed the
28
policymaking pride of place.

7

284. Compare, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a
Conservative Era, 39 Admin L Rev 353, 366-71 (1987) (Chevron departs from the fundamental principle
that courts decide questions of law) and Stephen BreyerJudicialReview of Questions of Fact and Law, 38
Admin L Rev 363, 372-82 (1986) (same), with Pierce, 1988 Duke LJ 300, 326 (cited in note 280)
(Chevron necessary to limit courts to applying law).
285. See text accompanying notes 60-98.
286. See text accompanying notes 99-123.
287. See text accompanying notes 203-50.
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One way of expressing the idea that Congress is often not making policy
worthy of extrapolation and application, but only cutting deals, as well as the
idea that the executive is the protector of the general public interest, is to
conclude that Congress creates less "law" when it enacts statutes than we
previously assumed. This leads immediately to a rule of parsimonious
statutory construction, of which Chevron is an expression. If this idea is carried
to its extreme, statutes deteriorate to symbolic utterances, suggesting that
Congress may not mean to enact any policy whatsoever. 28 8 If that is so,
judges conscientiously trying to ensure agency compliance with congressional
policy have nothing to do, because there is no policy to be applied. Judges
who continue to act aggressively must be doing so on the pretext of ensuring
agency compliance with congressional policy.
Under pessimistic pluralism, the scope of congressional "law" has been
constricted across the entire administrative spectrum. In the environmental
context, we have seen an additional and reinforcing shift, away from the
earlier treatment of environmental values as entitled to special judicial
protection whenever the Congress had enacted legislation designed to
achieve it.289 Hard look review developed as part of the attempt to ensure
that this fragile and important value would not be lost in the halls of the
bureaucracies. More recently, environmental protection has been
increasingly assimilated to the economic policy model, as but one value
among many, and a value to be evaluated just like the others, against an
ultimate standard of efficient resource allocation. 290 If the dominant issues in
EPA rulemaking have become economic, or at least a sort of cost and benefit
weighing that aspires to be fully quantified, as does the economic model, then
executive office oversight, especially through Office of Management and
Budget ("OMB"), seems worthy of consideration as a substitute for hard look
29
review, as has been suggested. '
In sum, the change between the earlier era and the present one, in terms
of assessing the rule of law error costs of aggressive judicial review, does not
come in the status the judiciary accords to protecting rule of law values. The
Justice Marshall who wrote Overton Park2 9 2 in 1971 and the Justice Stevens
who wrote Chevron 29 3 in 1984 agree that the rule of law controls substantive
288. See text accompanying notes 246-50.
289. See text accompanying notes 124-40.
290. See text accompanying notes 187-202.
291. See text accompanying note 297. This shift to treating the environment as ordinary can
influence statutory interpretation, even if it does not result in a lessening of judicial review
altogether. Take the Cotton Dust decision, as an example. Were Cotton Dust to be decided today, there
is good reason to think that the Court would interpret the Occupational Safety & Health Act
differently, as tolerating cost-benefit balancing, because of a growing conviction that allocational
efficiency is a paramount social goal, into which environmental and health concerns must be fit as
one set of benefits, to be merely weighed or traded-off against other costs. See, for example,
Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 492-93 (cited in note 3) (arguing that Congress probably never focused
on whether costs and benefits should be balanced under the Act, and that a statutory system that
requires a finding of significant risk yet precludes cost-benefit balancing is irrational).
292. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v I'olpe, 401 US 402 (197 1).
293. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 US 837.
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goals in the priority ranking of judicial obligations. Rather, the change that
has occurred, and that is manifest in these decisions, is a move toward a much
29 4
more modest sense of what the law is, and of what the statute commands.
Changes in the political model that underlie the agency-judiciarycongressional relationship have resulted in courts in the late period
concluding that Congress says less when it enacts a statute than did courts in
the early period. 2 9 5 As a result, aggressive judicial review fares less well under
rule of law criteria, because there is simply less law for courts to apply. When
the range of unreviewable discretionary activity expands, the presumptive
desirability of judicial review declines.
Some reappraisal of the costs and benefits of judicial review would have
occurred independently of the political changes discussed here. For example,
the shift to an emphasis on economic analysis in environmental policymaking
should probably have been anticipated all along, but it was submerged in
EPA's early years. While the costs of implementing their regulations have
always been a concern of the professionals as well as the politicians in the
agency, in the early period they could spot a number of opportunities to
improve environmental quality where costs seemed eminently justified by the
degree of improvement anticipated. These "cherry-picking" opportunities
have to a large extent been consumed in the past twenty years, so that the
typical regulatory issue now involves considerable economic costs and
debatable environmental benefits. 2 96 Once regulatory efforts turn to these
second- or third-generation problems, the idea that benefits ought to be
balanced with costs gains momentum. Agencies are better equipped to
conduct complex cost-benefit balances than thejudiciary. As a result, judicial
efforts to superintend agency balancing processes are perceived to be not
terribly successful.
Another example is the suggestion by some that aggressive judicial review
is less necessary because we have developed alternative mechanisms to fulfill
important rule of law functions. OMB oversight is the most frequent
example. 2 9 7 Whatever the merits of the argument, this is the kind of
consideration that would need recognition even during the days of the
partnership between court and agency.
Finally, one must consider the possibility that further study reveals that,
contrary to most assumptions, judicial review has very little impact on
ultimate agency actions, perhaps because agencies persist in pursuing their
294. Just as important as this difference are the apparent differences in approaching the question
of what to do when a judge becomes convinced that the statute contains no specific command
governing the precise question in the litigation before the court. The construction ofdefault rules to
govern in such cases is as much a part of a judge's job as interpreting statutes is. For a discussion of
how political theory influences both interpretive norms and default rules, see Stinstein, 103 Harv L
Rev at 411-12 (cited in note 3).
295. See text accompanying notes 212-18.
296. See text accompanying notes 13-24.
297. For example, some have argued that OMB review under Executive Orders 12291 and 12498
functions as a presidential substitute for aspects of hard look review. See, for example, Strauss, 1989
Duke L J at 548 (cited in note 2).
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own agendas and practically always find alternative means for doing so. 298
That conclusion weakens the case for aggressive judicial review from the
optimistic pluralist, capture theory, and special environmental values
perspective of the early period as well as from the pessimistic pluralist,
executive competence, ordinary environmental values perspective of the later
period.
Recent trends toward increasingly detailed statutes may also reinforce a
case against aggressive judicial review, whichever political assumptions one
endorses. From the pessimistic pluralist's view, detailed statutes such as the
1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act substantiate the claim that members of
Congress are in the dealmaking business, because very specific trade-offs,
compromises, and deals often do lie behind the increasingly complex terms
that Congress enacts. 29 9 From the optimistic pluralist's vantage point, such
statutory detail may make it extremely difficult for judges to ascertain any
underlying purpose for the statute, as statutory provisions come more and
more to resemble agency rules and regulations, but do not contain the
authoritative explanatory statement that accompanies Federal Register
publication of major rules. Faced with such specificity without revealed
purposes, the optimist need not abandon her assumption that Congress can
compose conflicting positions and adopt truly public policies, but she may
have to concede that the Congress either did not do so in a particular case or
that the policies adopted have become too opaque to be available for
purposes of judicial interpretation. In either case, an aggressive search for
statutory purposes will be unavailing.
However relatively independent of politics some elements of the costs and
benefits of judicial review may be, the nature of much of the debate about
aggressive judicial review suggests that the politically dependent
considerations remain terribly significant, and perhaps paramount. In recent
years, something of a revisionary movement has begun to question each of the
assumptions upon which the current preference for less aggressive judicial
review is based.
The political assumptions of pessimistic pluralism, executive competence,
and ordinary environmental values are far from self-evident, and may
inappropriately skew the role of each of the three branches in the
implementation of environmental policy. To begin with, the pessimistic
pluralist attack on Congress overstates the extent to which environmental
legislation is composed of interest group deals. There is no doubt that such
legislation involves tough, deal-like trade-offs, 30 0 or that environmental
298. Schuck and Elliott suggest reasons why judicial review may be ineffective in this way. See
Schuck & Elliott, 1990 Duke LJ at 1046-49 (cited in note 268); but available data is inconclusive on
the question of the effectiveness ofjudicial review. Id.
299. See text accompanying notes 27-28, 167-74, 181-86. See also, Frank H. Easterbrook,
Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv L Rev 4, 60 (1983) (the more detailed the law, the
more evidence of interest group compromise).
300. The acid rain title of the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments, with its emissions allowance
provision, as well as the job retraining provisions of the same statute, are obvious examples.
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protection is the object of self-interested advocacy. 3 0 ' Nevertheless, the
environmental legislation of the past two decades has also been the object of
public valuation; it reflects the consistently high value that citizens have
placed on environmental quality during that time. Furthermore, despite the
plethora of deals struck in the legislative negotiating process, one can
nevertheless discern a fairly consistent theme in these enactments, something
like a mandate to "do as much as is reasonably possible," with Congress often
30 2
refusing to translate that mandate into a simple cost-benefit formula.
This conclusion about environmental legislation is consistent with more
general studies which have shown that legislators tend to behave with mixed
motives, sometimes responding to their conception of the public interest, 30 3
and sometimes seeking to maximize individual self interest. 30 4

So it is

inaccurate to insist that, because of the deal-like nature of the legislative
product, environmental laws neither can nor do reflect any coherent public
policy. Instead of viewing the more detailed pollution control statutes of
recent years as no more than an aggregation of discrete bargains among selfinterested legislators, one can interpret them as an attempt, at least in part, to
displace earlier, vaguer, and perhaps more difficult to interpret formulations
of environmental policy with a series of more concrete strategies for achieving
environmentally protective goals.
The flip side of the coin is that the arguments advocating judicial
deference to agency policy judgments paint too rosy a picture of the nature of
executive branch decisionmaking. For the most part, the same theorists that
denigrate legislative "policy" as little more than efforts to promote individual
legislators' self interest heap plaudits on the policy decisions emanating from
politically accountable and substantively expert officials in the executive
branch. 30 5 The idea that agencies are susceptible to capture by the intended
targets of their regulatory efforts, which predominated in the 1960s and
1970s, 30 6 appears to have fallen by the wayside, despite the failure of the
301. The 1990 Clean Air bill is again instructive. Only one midwestern state emerged with an
exemption for its power plants from sulphur dioxide emissions reductions requirements-North
Dakota, one of whose senators is Chairman of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee.
See text accompanying note 202.
302. See, for example, Christopher H. Schroeder, The Evolution of Federal Regulation of Toxic
Substances, in Michael J. Lacey, ed, Government and Environmental Politics 263 (Wilson Center Press,
1989); Mark Sagoff, The Principles of Federal Pollution Laws, 78 Minn L Rev 19, 22-44 (1986).
303. See, for example, Michael E. Levine &Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest,
and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6J L Econ & Org 167 (1990); Farber & Frickey, 65 Tex L Rev
873 (cited in note 186);Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Captureand Ideology in the Economic Theory of
Politics, 74 Am Econ Rev 279 (1984); James B. Kau & Paul H. Rubin, Self-Interest, Ideology, and
Logrolling in Congressional Voting, 22J L & Econ 365 (1979); EdwardJ. Mitchell, The Basis of Congressional
Energy Policy, 57 Tex L Rev 591 (1979) (all arguing that ideology rather than economic interest has
been the dominant factor in congressional voting in certain areas).
304. See, for example, Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 449 (cited in note 3), citing Martha Detherick
& PaulJ. Quirk, The Politics of Deregulation (Brookings Inst, 1985). Professor Sunstein also asserts that
the argument in favor of treating legislation simply as "deals" is overstated because "t]he problems
of aggregating multiple desires do not always prevent the ascription of'purpose' to legislation." Id.
305. See text accompanying notes 203-44.
306. See text accompanying notes 99-123.
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advocates of enhanced executive branch power to demonstrate in any
systematic fashion that the same tendencies toward self-interested behavior
attributed to legislators do not also apply to agency policymakers. A
considerable body of commentary continues to submit that "[a]dministrative
agencies have failed to serve as vehicles for democratic aspirations" 3 0 7 and
that administrators remain vulnerable to the influence of well-organized
factions.

30 8

The possibility that statutory goals may be subverted by agency officials
beholden to or sympathetic with interest groups has not escaped Congress's
attention in the context of environmental policy. The 1984 amendments to
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and substantial portions of the
1986 Superfund Amendments were in large part a response to perceived
Reagan Administration efforts to ignore statutory directives or dismantle
regulatory programs. 30 9 The detailed provisions, statutory hammers, and
enhanced citizen suit opportunities included in those and other
environmental statutes adopted in the 1980s were designed to minimize the
chances for future agency attempts to derail statutory designs.3 1 0

These

provisions appear to be based on the belief that the earlier environmental
statutes did reflect discernible, coherent policy, but that the agency was prone
to ignore it. To remedy this situation, Congress translated more general
policy prescriptions into more specific "deals," which would be harder for the
agency to ignore. Because of Congress's recent difficulty in reauthorizing the
pollution control statutes, 3 1 such responses to problems discovered through
legislative oversight can take years to effectuate. If existing legislation indeed
incorporates discernible policy, the courts can play a meaningful role in
supplementing legislative oversight by invalidating agency decisions made on
the basis of factors not committed to the agency's discretion. 31 2
The current case against aggressive judicial review is also premised on the
assumption that adherence to principles of judicial restraint will prevent the
courts from implementing their own policy preferences in violation of
separation of powers principles. But, again, this proposition is not selfevident. In fact, a court may appear to be exercising restraint while instead
attempting to promote its own idea of optimal public policy. The potential
for this kind of subterfuge is especially high when the legislature reaches a
307. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism after the New Deal, 101 Harv L Rev 421, 429 (1987).
308. See id at 448, citing PaulJ. Quirk, Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies (Princeton U
Press, 1981); Kay Lehman Schlozman & John T. Tierney, Organized Interests and American Democray
(Harper & Row, 1986).
309. See for example, Investigation of the Environmental Protection Agency: Report on the
President's Claim of Executive Privilege over EPA Documents, Abuses in the Superfund Program
and Other Matters, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee On Energy
and Commerce, 98th Cong, 2d Sess (1984).
310. See Shapiro & Glicksman, 1988 Duke LJ at 824-30, 839-40 (cited in note 27).
311. Thirteen years elapsed between the last two sets of substantive revisions to the Clean Air
Act.
312. Compare Sunstein, 103 Harv L Rev at 440 n123 (cited in note 3), quoting The Federalist No.
78 (Hamilton), in Jacob Cooke, ed, The Federalist 528 (Wesleyan U Press, 1961) (an independent
judiciary inay be "an essential safeguard" against "unjust and impartial laws").
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policy decision on a particular issue and delegates the responsibility for
implementing it to an agency that disagrees with that policy. In such a
situation, the agency may seek to alter the policy judgment reached by the
legislature through the tools of statutory interpretation or implementation. If
a court sides with the agency's resolution of the policy issue, it may purport to
exercise judicial restraint by deferring to the agency, while at the same time
seeking to promote its own (and the agency's) conceptions of "wise" public
policy, at the expense of a policy chosen by the other political branch. 313 In
short, a court adhering to so-called principles ofjudicial "restraint" need not
be policy neutral. A recent study of the Supreme Court's environmental law
decisions of the last twenty years suggests that the exercise of institutional
judicial restraint appears to have "left ample opportunity for [judicial] policy
314
preferences to infuse the results of [these] judicial decisions."
Thus, the premises and conclusions of pessimistic pluralism, executive
competence, and the ordinariness of environmental values are vulnerable to
significant criticisms. This does not counsel a simple reversion to all the
assumptions of the earlier period, however. To be plausible, the evaluation of
aggressive judicial review will need to occur within a more realistic set of
political assumptions than optimistic pluralism seems capable of providing.
While the behavioral assumptions of pessimistic pluralism are far too
cynical, 3 1 5 optimistic pluralism was correspondingly naive about the
reasonableness and public-mindedness of public officials. 3 16 "What is needed
is a rework of the field which will assign 'capture' and public-interest accounts
of regulation to appropriate spheres." 31 7 In addition, realistic political theory
must grapple with issues raised by the recent republican revival and ignored
by much of pluralism, and especially with the project of describing public
values in a way that makes so-called public-interest motivational theories
credible.3 18 Finally, any ascription of "public purposes" to legislative
enactments has to acknowledge the conceptual difficulties in ascribing
purposes to collective assemblies.
Work on these fronts may well result in acceptance of the propositions just
explored, that is, (1) that legislators at least some of the time eschew selfinterested bargaining in favor of an attempt to promote the public interest,
and that environmental legislation at least occasionally reflects coherent
public policy; (2) that agency officials, including those at EPA, are vulnerable
313. In a situation like this, the court is exercising what might be called "institutional restraint" in
that, by deferring to the agency's views instead of making de novo judgments, the court purports to
be limiting its own power in relation to the power of another branch of government, the executive.
See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in the Supreme Court's
Environmental Law Decisions, 42 Vand L Rev 343, 349-50 (1989). But if the court ignores the policy
determination reached by the legislature in order to service its own preference for the agency's
policy, the court is at the same time exercising what might be called "policy activism." Id at 350-52.
314. See id at 363.
315. See text accompanying notes 164-73.
316. See text accompanying notes 60-68.
317. Levine & Forrence, 6J L Econ & Org at 167, 171 (cited in note 303).
318. See text accompanying notes 177-86.

Page 249: Autumn 1991]

EPA

AND THE COURTS

to capture by the same kinds of factions that allegedly dominate the legislative
process, according to public choice theory; and (3) that the exercise of
principles of judicial restraint does not guarantee policy neutrality by the
courts. If so, then the costs and benefits of judicial review should be
reassessed in light of them. Not surprisingly, some of the costs that seem
substantial under pessimistic pluralist assumptions will recede, while benefits
dismissed as inconsequential will begin to appear more weighty. If, for
example, judicial restraint is not a guarantor of policy neutrality by the courts,
then the distortion of environmental policy that critics attribute to aggressive
judicial review can also result with minimalist, detached review.3 1 9 On the
benefit side, the possibility that agency decisionmakers will be captured by
special interests cuts against the argument that the rule of law gains arising
from aggressive judicial review could be achieved just as well or better
through alternatives like OMB review of EPA rulemakings. Perhaps most
important, this potential for capture, coupled with the recognition that
Congress can and sometimes does make public policy, may restore the
legislature, if not back to the predominant "policymaking pride of place" it
held during EPA's early years, at least into a position equal to that of the
executive.3 20 Rehabilitation of the perception that Congress gives purpose
and direction to EPA when it enacts environmental legislation could restore
the presumptive desirability of judicial review by enhancing the rule of law
gains likely to flow from it.
It took less than twenty years for the political assumptions of the early
years of EPA, which helped generate hard look review, to fall prey to the
criticisms spawned by pessimistic pluralism. One can speculate whether the
political assumptions that ushered in the more recent era of deferential
judicial review will have a longer tenure. Given recent criticisms of these
assumptions, and assuming that the analysis of environmental values
ultimately resists complete assimilation to a cost-benefit calculus, it is
reasonable to predict that judicial review doctrines will moderate once more.
If so, analysis of judicial review may move to some position in between the
unanalyzed self-confidence of Overton Park and Judge Leventhal's substantive
review theory, and the overly and mistakenly deferential position
characterized by Chevron.

319. We refer again here to the orthodox view that once Congress enacts legislation that
embraces a particular policy judgment, it is not the proper function of either a court or an agency to
ignore that judgment. See text accompanying note 275. To do so would be to engage in the same
kind of "substantive mistake" that occurs when an "activist" court displaces an agency policy with
which it disagrees.
320. See text accompanying notes 210-21.

